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INTRODUCTION
The 1992 NCAA Men's BasketbaU Championship Game was
the most watched basketball game in television history.' In addi-
tion to being very popular, college basketball has become extreme-
ly profitable The tremendous rise in the popularity and profit-
ability of college basketball and other college sports has led to in-
creased concern about the fairness of the administration of colle-
giate athletics. The National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA), founded in 1906, oversees the administration of colle-
giate athletics and establishes the playing rules and regulations
governing the behavior of member institutions and student-ath-
letes.3 Its basic purpose is to "maintain intercollegiate athletics as
an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an
integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear
line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and profes-
1. Setting a record for a single collegiate or professional basketball game, 58 mil-
lion television viewers watched Duke beat Michigan for the NCAA title. Steven Herbert,
NCAA Final Sets U.S. TV Mark, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1992, at F2.
2. Non-television revenue generated by the 1992 NCAA Men's Basketball Champi-
onship Tournament exceeded $11 million. 1992-93 General Operating Budget, NCAA
NEWS, Sept. 2, 1992, at 13. Moreover, in 1992, the NCAA distributed over $73 million to
the membership from its seven-year, $1-billion television contract with CBS. Revenue
Fund Pays out $73.4 Million, NCAA NEws, Sept. 14, 1992, at 1.
3. The NCAA maintains a full-time administrative staff and headquarters in Over-
land Park, Kansas. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, 1992-1993 NCAA
MANUAL 441-42 (1992) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL]. The NCAA has become a multi-
million-dollar organization. Its operating revenue in 1992-1993 is $166,308,300, a six-per-
cent increase over the previous year's figure. Budget's Direct Payments Top $106 Million,
NCAA NEWS, Sept. 2, 1992, at 1, 13.
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sional sports."4 The NCAA is comprised of "colleges, universities,
athletics cbnferences or associations and other groups that are
related to intercollegiate athletics."5 The responsibilities of its
active members include compliance with the NCAA constitution,
bylaws, and other legislation.6 In addition, active members must
certify the eligibility of all student-athletes and must ban ineligible
athletes from competition Consistent with its enforcement proce-
dures,8 the NCAA may discipline active members who violate
NCAA rules.9
All active and qualified member institutions control NCAA
policies through annual conventions."0 Between conventions, the
ruling body of the NCAA is the 46-member NCAA Council,1
whose responsibilities include establishing the general policy of the
association, reporting to the conventions, and interpreting NCAA
regulations. 2 The NCAA Council appoints a Committee on In-
fractions to administer the NCAA's enforcement program. 3 The
Committee's duties include considering complaints that a member
institution has failed to "meet the conditions and obligations of
membership,' 4 determining facts related to alleged violations of
NCAA regulations, 5 imposing the appropriate penalties for major
violations, 6 establishing enforcement policies and procedures, 7
and overseeing investigations of alleged rules violations. 8 The
4. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 1.3.1.
5. Id. art. 3.1.1. The NCAA's membership has steadily expanded, reaching a record
total of 1,064 for the 1992-1993 academic year. Membership Total Sets Mark, NCAA
NEWS, Sept. 2, 1992, at 1.
6. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 3.2.4.1.
7. 1i art. 3.2.4.3.
8. For a discussion of current NCAA enforcement procedures, see infra Section
II(B).
9. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 3.2.6. Two-thirds of the delegates present at
the NCAA annual convention may terminate or suspend an institution's membership for
failing to comply with NCAA rules. Id. arts. 3.2.5.1, 19.4.3.
10. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, 1991-1992 GENERAL INFORMA-
TION 2 (1991).
11. Id.
12. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 4.1.3.
13. Id. art. 19.1.
14. i art. 19.1.3(a).
15. Id. art. 19.1.3(c).
16. Id art. 19.1.3(d). The Committee on Infractions may also consider appeals of
secondary violations, Id.
17. 1& art. 19,2. These procedures are subject to the Council's review.
18. See id. art. 19.1.3(e).
DUE PROCESS & THE NCAA
NCAA enforcement staff works for the Committee on Infractions
and is responsible for gathering the facts and presenting the
NCAA's case at an investigative hearing.1 9
During the past few years there have been many highly-publi-
cized cases of NCAA investigations involving major universities.'0
An institution found guilty of violating NCAA rules could face
adverse publicity., lose revenue as consequences of penalties im-
posed,' and suffer damage to its reputation. Although these re-
percussions have existed for many years, the decade-long dispute
involving former University of Nevada at Las Vegas head basket-
ball coach Jerry Tarkanian brought the fairness of NCAA enforce-
ment procedures under the intense scrutiny of the media, the
general public, and state and federal legislatures. In spite of public
concern that the NCAA's complex regulations and virtual monop-
oly over collegiate athletics enable the NCAA to unilaterally pros-
ecute and penalize any institution it chooses, the Supreme Court
determined in NCAA v. Tarkanian that because the NCAA is
not a state actor, it is not required to comply with due process. 4
As a result, the Court refused to intervene in the NCAA's disci-
pline of the university. However, since Tarkanian, public opinion
has continued to push the NCAA25 and federal and state legisla-
tures26 to reform NCAA procedures.
This Note considers, given this public cry for reform, what
due process protections, if any, are missing from NCAA enforce-
ment procedures, and whether state or federal legislation is the
appropriate method for reforming NCAA enforcement regulations.
19. See id. arts. 19, 32.
20. These institutions include the University of Florida, University of Illinois, Univer-
sity of Kentucky, University of Maryland, University of Missouri, University of Nevada at
Las Vegas, North Carolina State University, and Syracuse University.
21. This negative publicity may impede the institution's recruiting and fundraising
efforts.
22. For example, the Committee on Infractions may prohibit television coverage of
athletic contests, forbid participation in post-season tournaments or competition, or re-
quire the refund of money received through the participation of an ineligible student-
athlete. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 19.4.2.1.
23. 488 U.S. 179 (1988). Tarkanian, in a suit that eventually reached the United
States Supreme Court, claimed that the immense power of the NCAA enforcement pro-
cedures should be limited by imposing due process protections. See id. at 181, 191-92.
24. Id. at 182, 199.
25. For a discussion of recent efforts to reform the NCAA's procedures, see infra
Section II(C).
26. For a discussion of state and federal legislation, see infra Sections III(A)-(B).
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Part I outlines the legal issues surrounding the application of due
process requirements to NCAA regulations. Although the NCAA
is not a state actor, an understanding of traditional due process
analysis is necessary to the evaluation of whether there is a need
for reforming NCAA enforcement procedures. Part II examines
whether NCAA regulations would comply with due process re-
quirements if the NCAA were a state actor. This Part argues that
the majority of due process requirements are met by current rules,
and that proposed reforms would. cure most of the remaining defi-
ciencies. Part III examines proposed and enacted state and federal
legislation reforming NCAA regulations. This Note concludes that
given the intrusiveness of such legislation, which will likely lead to
many NCAA challenges (such as the one to Nevada's due process
legislation)' and the promising nature of the reforms that contin-
ue to be instituted by the NCAA, the NCAA should continue to
oversee its own reform.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND RULES: TRADITIONAL DUE
PROCESS ANALYSIS
Through the years various lawsuits have challenged the
NCAA's enforcement procedures.' The case that has generated
the most publicity involved Jerry Tarkanian, former head basket-
ball coach at the University of Nevada at Las Vegas (UNLV).
Claiming that the NCAA had failed to provide him with due
process during its investigation of violations at UNLV, Tarkanian
challenged NCAA enforcement regulations in a case initiated in
1977 that reached the United States Supreme Court in 1988.29
The Supreme Court held that the NCAA was not a state actor,
and therefore did not consider whethbr NCAA regulations afford-
ed Tarkanian due process." Section A discusses the Supreme
27. In NCAA v. Miller, 795 F. Supp. 1476, 1488 (D. Nev. 1992), the federal district
court held in favor of the NCAA in ruling that the Nevada statute, which required the
NCAA to conform to certain due process requirements, was unconstitutional under the
Commerce and Contract Clauses of the United States Constitution and therefore invalid
and unenforceable. See infra subsection III(A)(2).
28. E.g., Arlosoroff v. NCAA, 746 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir. 1984); Regents of Univ. of
Minn. v. NCAA, 560 F.2d 352 (8th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 978 (1977); Howard
Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir.
1975).
29. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 181 (1988).
30. Id. at 182, 199. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
requires state actors to comply with due process, is inapplicable to those who are not
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Court's decision in Tarkanian. Although the Court held that nei-
ther the United States Constitution nor federal law requires the
NCAA to comply with due process, state and federal legislatures
are nonetheless attempting to force the NCAA to implement due
process protections.3 To establish a framework for evaluating
current NCAA regulations and the necessity of legislative reform,
Section B analyzes how traditional due process requirements
would apply to the NCAA were it a state actor.
A. The State Actor Issue in NCAA v. Tarkanian
In the early 1970s, the NCAA began investigating Tarkanian
and UNLV for potential violations of NCAA rules. In 1976, the
NCAA Committee on Infractions issued an Official Inquiry to
UNLV that listed alleged NCAA rules violations and, as prepara-
tion for hearings on these charges, requested the University, a
public institution, to conduct its own investigation into the alleged
violations.
During four days of hearings, the NCAA's Committee on
Infractions evaluated the NCAA enforcement staff's evidence and
UNLV's response.' Prior to the hearings, UNLV's requests for
disclosure of the sources and bases of the allegations had been
denied.33 Tarkanian attended the hearings and was represented by
counsel on two of the four days, but the persons making the alle-
gations were not present for examination. An NCAA audiotape of
the hearings, kept at NCAA headquarters in Kansas, provided the
only record of the hearings.'
Following the hearings, the Committee on Infractions issued a
confidential report that found thirty-eight violations of NCAA
rules, including ten naming Tarkanian.35 The NCAA imposed
state actors. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982); Lugar v. Edmondson
Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982).
31. Four states (Florida, Illinois, Nebraska, and Nevada) have enacted legislation
requiring the NCAA to comply with due process. Eight states (California, Iowa, Kansas,
Minnesota, Mississippi, New York, Rhode Island, and South Carolina) and the House of
Representatives have introduced similar legislation. See infra Sections III(A)-(B).
32. University of Nev. v. Tarkanian, 594 P.2d 1159, 1160 (Nev. 1979). UNLV's af-
fidavits and sworn testimonies frequently conflicted with the NCAA's evidence, which
consisted primarily of investigators' recollections of conversations. UNLV also challenged
the credibility of the NCAA investigators and informants. Id. at 1161.
33. Id. at 1160-61.
34. Id. at 1161.
35. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 185-86 (1988). The Official Inquiry originally
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penalties on the UNLV athletic program and directed the Univer-
sity to "show cause why .additional penalties should not be im-
posed against UNLV" if it did not suspend Tarkanian from in-
volvement with the athletic department during the University's
probation. 6 Alleging that the NCAA investigation and hearing
had deprived him of liberty and property without due process, in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,3' Tarkanian challenged the NCAA
enforcement regulations and the NCAA's attempt to force his
suspension."
In a 5-4 decision, the United States Supreme Court held that
because the NCAA's investigations did not constitute state action,
the NCAA was not a state actor for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment or 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and therefore was not required
to comply with due process.39 Although UNLV, as a public insti-
tution, engaged in state action when it adopted the NCAA regula-
tions, it did not thereby transform the regulations into state rules,
or the NCAA into a state actor.'° Additionally, because the
NCAA did not force UNLV to comply with its recommenda-
tions4' but rather UNLV chose to comply with the NCAA regula-
alleged many other recruiting, academic, and eligibility violations by UNLV. The most
serious charge asserted that Tarkanian attempted to impede the NCAA investigation. Id.
at 186 n.9.
36. Id. at 186. The NCAA bylaws limit -the NCAA's authority to impose sanctions
on member institutions and do not allow direct actions against a member institution's
employees: Id at 183-84 & nn.6-7.
37. Id at 187.
38. Tarkanian obtained an injunction in Nevada state court enjoining UNLV from
enforcing the suspension. University of Nev. v. Tarkanian, 594 P.2d 1159 (1979). The
Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the injunction. Tarkanian v. NCAA, 741 P.2d 1345
(1987). The NCAA appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari to decide,
for the first time, whether the NCAA is a state actor. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179
(1988).
39. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 182, 199. The pertinent section of the federal law pro-
vides: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of'the United
States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). The Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause states that "nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. The
Court held that "[i]n this case the under-color-of-law requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment are equivalent."
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 182 n.4.
40. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 194.
41. The University possesses the authority to withdraw from the NCAA and follow
its own rules and to work with the NCAA to amend any rules it considers unfair. Id. at
194-95.
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tions, the Court ruled that the University's participation in the
formulation of the bylaws did not make the NCAA a state ac-
tor. 2 The Court concluded that the NCAA, as the enforcer of
the NCAA's bylaws, is the private representative of its member
institutions, not the state agent of UNLV 3
Because the Supreme Court held that the NCAA was not a
state actor, it never reached the merits of Tarkanian's due process
claim. Therefore, the Supreme Court did not analyze whether
Tarkanian received due process, or what due process protections,
if any, the NCAA should incorporate into its enforcement pro-
cedures. Nevertheless, the enormous publicity generated by this
case, the recent proposed and enacted state and federal legislation,
and the NCAA's legal challenge against these state laws" have
kept the due process issue in the limelight, where it will probably
remain until the public is satisfied that NCAA enforcement regu-
lations conform with due process requirements. Because due pro-
cess is the standard selected by the groups urging NCAA reform,
it is important to examine how due process requirements would
apply to the NCAA if it were a state actor.
B. Due Process Requirements
Due process analysis consists of two parts: first, what rights
are classified as "life, liberty, or property,"45 and, second, what
process is "due."4
42. Id. at 195. The Court also pointed out that even though UNLV may not find
alternative responses, such as withdrawing from the NCAA, attractive (as it would want
to remain a basketball power), a private monopolist's ability to force its will on a state
entity does not transform the private party into a state actor. Id. at 198-99 & n.19 (cit-
ing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351-52 (1974)).
43. Id. at 196. Legal scholars have criticized the rationale underlying the Supreme
Court's decision. See, e.g., Kevin M. McKenna, The Tarkanian Decision: The State of
College Athletics Is Everything but State Action, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 459, 494-97 (1991).
44. For a discussion of the NCAA's challenge to Nevada's due process law, see
infra subsection III(A)(2).
45. This step formerly distinguished between "rights" and "privileges." However,
courts no longer utilize this distinction because they have determined that due process
protection should extend to "privileges" as well as- "rights." JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD
D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13.5, at 514 (4th ed. 1991); see also PETER L.
STRAUSS, AN INTRODUCIION TO ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 38
(1989); William Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitu-
tional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1462-63 (1969). But see Rodney A. Smolla, The
Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law: The Price of Pro-
testing Too Much, 35 STAN. L. REV. 69, 69 (1982).
46. It is difficult to develop a comprehensive list of required procedures as due
1992]
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1. What Rights Are Protected Under Due Process? Regard-
less of how unfair or arbitrary a governmental action is, due pro-
cess is not required if the government does not deprive an individ-
ual of "life, liberty, or property. ' 47 Because life is deprived in
rare instances48 and would not apply to NCAA action even if it
were a state actor, this Note focuses on the more complex issues
raised by liberty and property rights.49
Generally, if a state actor deprives an individual of the free-
dom to engage in "some significant area of human activity"-i.e.,
liberty-a procedure must exist that examines the basis and the
legality of the deprivation." A government action deprives an
individual of liberty if it limits the individual's freedom of choice
or prevents the exercise of a constitutionally protected right.51
Thus if, for example, a government action forecloses an individual
from a wide range of employment opportunities, a hearing must
be accorded that individual. 2
Determining whether a government action deprives an indi-
vidual of property without due process hinges on the question of
what constitutes property.53 Benefits that do not fall within the
traditional real and personal property categories have presented
difficulties for the courts.' But the Supreme Court has recognized
process is more amorphous than other legal concepts and must be applied on a case-by-
case basis, with careful attention to the specific situation. "'Due process is not a mechan-
ical instrument . . . . It is a delicate process of adjustment inescapably involving the
exercise of judgment by those whom the Constitution entrusted with the unfolding of the
process.'" STRAUSS, supra note 45, at 37 n.92 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm.
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
47. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 45, § 13.2, at 491.
48. For example, capital punishment. See id. § 13.3, at 491-96.
49. This determination of whether liberty and property interests are deprived does
not indicate whether there has been a due process 'violation. Finding interference with
liberty and property interests is merely the first step of the due process analysis. Depri-
vation of liberty and property interests may satisfy judicial scrutiny if the appropriate due
process procedures, see infra subsection I(B)(2), have been followed.
50. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 45, § 13.4(d), at 509 (citing Henry P.
Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property", 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405 (1977)).
51. For example, deprivation occurs if the challenged action makes certain activity-
e.g., engaging in a particular business, id § 13.4(d), at 508-09--illegal or impossible. Id. §
13.4(a), at 497. However, unless prohibited by the Constitution, the government can limit
individual freedom to promote societal interests. IL § 13.4(c), at 505.
52. Id. § 13.4(d), at 509; cf. id. ("[I]f an agency . . .seeks to revoke the profession-
al status or license of a doctor or lawyer, it must accord that individual a fair hearing.").
53. Id. § 13.5, at 513.
54. For example, welfare payments or right to public education. Id. § 13.5, at 514.
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protected property interests in benefits to which an individual can
demonstrate entitlement.55 To determine if an individual has a
"fair claim" to a benefit that has been denied, a court examines
local law. If the court finds a property interest under local law, it
then determines if the state utilized fair procedures in denying the
benefit. 6
The Supreme Court illustrated its views on liberty and prop-
erty rights in two landmark cases. In Board of Regents v. Roth,57
the Supreme Court held that a university professor who was not
rehired by a state university was not entitled to a hearing or a
statement of reasons for the decision." The Court examined the
nature of the professor's deprivation to deterniine if his interests
were protected by the Fourteeifth Amendment." It found that the
university dismissed Roth consistent with state law and without
damaging his reputation or preventing him from securing other
employment. Because the university had hired Roth for a specified
term, and Roth was not a tenured professor, the Court concluded
that he had no right to continued employment after the term
expired.' Moreover, the Court held that because the university's
actions did not damage Roth's reputation, honor, or integrity, or
create a stigma that would prevent him from securing other work,
Roth was not deprived of a liberty interest protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment,61 and therefore, he was not entitled to the
heightened protection of due process. 2 Although Roth did not
55. The individual must have already "received the benefit" or "had a previously
recognized claim of entitlement." Id.; see also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
576 (1972). However, demonstrating an entitlement merely recognizes an interest in keep-
ing a right, not a requirement that the right must always be preserved. William G. Buss,
Due Process in the Enforcement of Amateur Sports Rules, in LAW & AMATEUR SPORTS
1, 15-16 (Ron~ld J. Walcukauski ed., 1982).
56. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 45, § 13.5, at 516; see also Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-41 (1985); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 192-93
nn.10-11 (1984).
57. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
58. Id. at 578-79.
59. Id. at 571. The Court recognized that the liberty interest protected included
"'freedom from bodily restraint'" and "'the right of the.individual to contract, to engage
in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, estab-
lish a home and bring up children .... and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free [people].'" Id. at
572 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
60. Id. at 566-68.
61. Id. at 575.
62. Id. at 573-74.
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possess a liberty interest in being rehired, the Court nonetheless
recognized that "[t]here might be cases in which a State refused to
reemploy a person under such circumstances that interests in liber-
ty would be implicated."' For example, a State cannot so damage
an employee's reputation as to limit the employee's freedom of
choice ,' or foreclose other employment opportunities, without
due process. 5
In addition, the Court ruled that Roth had no property inter-
est in another term of employment since he had no "legitimate
claim of entitlement" to it." Roth's property interest in his em-
ployment was limited by the specific terms of his appointment and
did not extend to being rehired for another term.'
In Perry v. Sindermann," the companion case to Roth, the
Court elaborated on the method for determining which property
rights receive due process protection. After four successive one-
year teaching contracts, a public college's board of regents refused
to renew a professor's contract and did not provide an official
statement of reasons or an opportunity for a hearing. 9 The pro-
fessor, Sindermann, claimed that the board's practice of renewing
one-year contracts constituted de facto, tenure and that the board
had deprived him of his due process rights." The Court referred
to Roth and held that since "'property' denotes a broad range of
interests that are secured by 'existing rules or understandings,' 971
the board of regents may have created an unwritten "common
63. Id at 573.
64. Nevertheless, damage to personal reputation without proof of other harm does
not constitute deprivation of "liberty" under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708-10 (1976) (stating that damage to a person's reputation is not a
per se deprivation of liberty). The individual can recover damages for this injury under
traditional tort theory. For a discussion of why this right should be protected by due pro-
cess, see Henry P. Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property", 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405,
432-34 (1977).
65. Roth, 408 U.S. at 573-74; see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (holding dis-
ciplinary action against students without due process a deprivation of liberty if it damages
relationships with other students or future education or employment prospects).
66. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. The Court stated that "[t]o have a property interest in a
benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must
have more than a unilateral expectation of it." Id
67. Itd at 578.
68. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
69. Id. at 594-95.
70. Id at 600-01.
71. Id at 601 (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 577).
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law" agreement giving employees tenure.' The Court concluded
that if on remand Sindermann could demonstrate a property inter-
est arising from such "common law" tenure, he would be entitled
to a statement of reasons and a hearing.'
To receive due process protection, then, an individual must
demonstrate either a liberty or a property interest that is deprived
by the challenged action. Institutions and individuals under investi-
gation by the NCAA have several liberty interests at stake. The
NCAA can dictate when a member institution must terminate a
coach or suspend a student,74 and thus may deprive an institution
of a liberty interest in freedom of association or freedom of
choice. The terminated coach, unlike tie professors in the above
cases, could claim that the stigma associated with a termination or
suspension could prohibit future choices of coaching employ-
ment." Similarly, a student-athlete who has been declared ineligi-
ble to compete could claim a deprivation of the liberty interest in
engaging in a significant human activity or in attempting to pursue
a professional sports career.76 Again, if indeed there has been a
deprivation of an individual's (here, a coach's or a student's) liber-
ty interest, such individual must be accorded a fair hearing.'
NCAA investigations also threaten several protected property
interests. For example, NCAA sanctions may deprive an institution
of a property interest in the money it would have received from
72. Id. at 602.
73. Id at 603. However, a person can be discharged without due process protection
if the employment is terminable for any reason under applicable law. NOWAK & ROTUN-
DA, supra note 45, § 13.5, at 515 (citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976)).
74. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 14.13.1, 19.4.2.
75. See Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that even
though there is no long-term employment contract, coaches have a liberty interest in
their occupation); Stanley v. Big Eight Conference, 463 F. Supp. 920 (W.D. Mo. 1978)
(ruling that football coach has liberty interest in his good name and reputation because
they affect his ability to secure another coaching position). But see Codd v. Velger, 429
U.S. 624 (1977) (determining that an employee is entitled to a hearing only if the em-
ployer created and disseminated false and defamatory information about the employee).
76. Behagen v. Intercollegiate Conference of Faculty Representatives, 346 F. Supp.
602, 604 (D. Minn. 1972); JOHN WEISTART & CYM H. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS
24-25 (1979). However, even though some cases emphasize the significance of "an entire
line of employment activity," courts have generally been reluctant to find such a liberty
interest. Buss, supra note 55, at 13; see, e.g., Colorado Seminary v. NCAA, 417 F. Supp.
885, 895 (D. Colo. 1976) (characterizing the college athletic forum as a training ground
for professional careers but declining to find a liberty interest in speculative professional
career).
77. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
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television broadcasts of regular season games or appearances in
post-season tournaments.' If the NCAA requires an institution to
terminate a coach's employment, the coach may claim loss of a
property interest in future income.79 A suspended student-athlete
may claim deprivation of a property interest in an athletic scholar-
ship and in the opportunity to obtain a cost-free education or to
develop skills necessary for a future professional athletic career.'
Because NCAA investigations imperil both liberty and prop-
erty interests, affected parties would be entitled to due process
protection if the NCAA were a state actor. Indeed, as discussed in
Part II, proponents of NCAA reform argue that subjects of
NCAA investigations should be provided with a high level of due
process protection.
2. Determining What Process Is Due.81  Although the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments specify that a person deprived of
life, liberty, or property is entitled to due process, they do not
define what process is due. The Supreme Court, in Mathews v.
Eldridge,' established a balancing test for determining what pro-
cess is due-a test that transfers certain adversarial procedures to
the administrative process." This subsection provides a framework
for analyzing the specific due process requirements that would
apply .to the NCAA under the proposed and enacted state and
federal due process legislation.
78. As a penalty for rules violations, the NCAA may forbid television appearances
or participation in post-season tournaments. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 19.4.2.5,
19.4.2(d), (e), (f).
79. However, for NCAA coaches, a property interest in employment is difficult to
prove because coaches do not have long-term contracts. In fact, it is common for institu-
tions to fire coaches before their contracts expire if their teams are not winning.
80. A student-athlete could also claim a, property interest in education at a particu-
lar institution. Ira Berkow, Sports of the Times: A Solution for McRae vs. N.C.A.A., N.Y.
TiMEs, Dec. 17, 1991, at B13 (student temporarily declared ineligible to play for Syracuse
University by the NCAA claimed he was deprived of his right to attend Syracuse for its
communications department). Because courts have generally refused to recognize students'
property rights in interscholastic athletics, student-athletes should attempt to demonstrate
that athletics is more than a component of education. They must prove it is their only
chance for a career. Robert G. Riegel, Jr. & Mark A. Hanley, Comment, Judicial Review
of NCAA Decisions: Does the College Athlete Have a Property Interest in Interscholastic
Athletics?, 10 STETSON L. REv. 483, 501-02 (1981).
81. For a discussion of whether current NCAA procedures comply with the due pro-
cess standards discussed in this Section, see infra subsection II(B)(2).
82. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
83. For the Court's formulation of this test, see infra text accompanying note 101.
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a. Procedures required by the Due Process Clauses. The
Supreme Court has consistently demonstrated its belief that proce-
dures transferred from the adversary process to administrative
hearings will satisfy the due process requirements of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments and will protect an individual from arbi-
trary governmental action." For example, Goldberg v. Kelly" ex-
tended to administrative proceedings the practice in criminal cases
of specifying detailed procedural requirements.86 In Goldberg, the
Court held that the state could not even temporarily terminate
welfare benefits without due process protectionY Although the
state conceded that the welfare recipient was entitled to notice
and informal communications with a welfare official, the Court
ruled that due process also required an impartial hearing, the right
to an attorney, the right to present evidence, the opportunity to
cross-examine, and an opinion explaining the decision."
Because of the factual nature of any due process inquiry,
there is no definitive list of required due process elements. 9
However, Judge Henry Friendly of the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit developed the following prioritized list of proce-
dures, taken from criminal trials,' required for a fair hearing,
that should be included in any administrative due process claim:
1. An unbiased tribunal.
2. Notice of the proposed action and the grounds asserted for
it.
3. Opportunity to present reasons why the proposed action
should not be taken.
4. The right to present evidence, including the right to call
witnesses.
5. The right to know opposing evidence.
6. The right to cross-examine witnesses.
7. A decision based exclusively on the evidence presented.
8. Opportunity to be represented by counsel.
84. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 45, § 13.8, at 524.
85. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
86. STRAUSS, supra note 45, at 40.
87. 397 U.S. at 264.
88. Id. at 266-71.
89. STRAUSS, supra note 45, at 47.
90. This Note utilizes Judge Friendly's relatively stringent requirements, as opposed
to more lenient administrative standards, see, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 577-84
(1975), because the state and federal legislatures and the public are calling for strict
compliance with due process to safeguard the critical interests at stake.
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9. Requirement that the tribunal prepare.a record of the evi-
dence presented.
10. Requirement that the tribunal prepare written findings of
fact and reasons for its decision.9'
Judge Friendly also included requirements for public attendance
and judicial review, but questioned their applicability to adminis-
trative hearings.' The requirement of an unbiased tribunal93
prevents the participation of adjudicators who have personal stakes
in a case, including monetary or professional interests.94 However,
the list does not require a separate investigator/prosecutor and
adjudicator in administrative proceedings.95 In fact, the Supreme
Court has held that it is possible for an administrative law judge
'to direct the inquiry, present the government's case, and decide
the dispute without compromising the duty to be impartial.96
b. The Matthews balancing test. In Mathews v. Eld-
ridge,7' the Supreme Court devised a balancing test for determin-
ing what procedures are required before an individual may be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property. This case involved a due pro-
cess claim, based on Goldberg v. Kelly,98 that Social Security dis-
ability benefits could not be terminated without a pre-termination
evidentiary hearing.' Stating that "'due process is flexible and
91. STRAUSS, supra note 45, at 47-48 (citing Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hear-
ing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267 (1975)). Although this list is still highly influential and is
organized in order of importance, the courts will determine the required procedures on a
case-by-case basis. Id at 48.
92. Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U, PA. L. REV. '1267, 1293-95
(1975). Judge Friendly 'did not separately list the right to cross-examine witnesses, but
discussed it extensively. Id. at 1282-86.
93. Although different cases require different procedures, courts consistently require
an impartial and fair process, including a neutral judge. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note
45, § 13.8, at 528.
94. Id.
95. STRAUSS, supra note 45, at 48.
96. Id. at 48 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971)); see also Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975); Ronald D.
Rotunda, The Combination of Functions in Administrative Actions: An Examination of
European Alternatives, 40 FORDHAM L. REv. 101 (1971).
97. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
98. 397 U.S. 254 (1970); see supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
99. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 325. The Secretary of the Social Security Administration
(SSA) agreed that continued disability benefits constituted a property interest, but never-
theless contended that the agency's existing procedures satisfied due process requirements.
Id at 332-33.
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calls for such procedural protection as the particular situation de-
mands," '' 'l ° the Court identified the following three factors for
determining the requisite procedures:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such inter-
est through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any,
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail. °'
Applying this balancing test, the Court held that existing Social
Security Administration (SSA) procedures satisfied due process
requirements."°
This balancing test developed by the Supreme Court address-
es the "variability of procedural requirements" and "emphasizes
that each setting or program invites its own assessment."1" For
example, the Court distinguished the outcome in the Mathews case
from that in Goldberg."N Accordingly, courts should apply the
Mathews test to the operation of the administrative program as a
whole, rather than focus on the specific facts of a particular
case.105 Therefore, determining whether NCAA regulations pro-
vide due process protection requires an analysis of the NCAA's
overall enforcement process, not particular cases.
100. Id. at 334 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
101. Id. at 335. Therefore, the court must balance the "importance of the individual
liberty or property interest" and the possibility of reducing erroneous judgments against
the increased administrative costs. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 45, § 13.8, at 531.
102. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349. The Court held that the physically disabled worker's
personal interest was less than in other cases as the potential deprivation from terminat-
ed benefits would probably be minimal, given possible sources of other income. Id. at
341-42. In addition, the Court ruled that because current SSA procedures were fair and
were likely to produce reliable results, a hearing would not add substantial value to the
process. Id. at 343-45. Finally, the Court stated that the administrative and societal costs
would be substantial. Id. at 347-48.
103. STRAUSS, supra note 45, at 45.
104. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 340. Because terminating welfare benefits pending determi-
nation of the claim may deprive the beneficiary of the means to live, the private interest
in Goldberg was greater than that in Mathews. Id. In addition, the SSA procedures in
Mathews were more reliable and fair than those in Goldberg. Id. at 344-45.
105. See STRAUSS, supra note 45, at 45.
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II. NCAA REGULATIONS AND DUE PROCESS:
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
Although the NCAA is not bound by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution, an evaluation of the ne-
cessity of due process reform of the NCAA requires an examina-
tion of whether existing NCAA enforcement procedures satisfy
constitutional standards."° Section A reviews traditional due pro-
cess criticisms of the Association by focusing on complaints aired
during the 1978 Congressional hearings on the NCAA. Section B
discusses current NCAA enforcement regulations"° and evaluates
whether they satisfy due process requirements. This Section con-
cludes that, although NCAA regulations generally comply with due
process, a few deficiencies exist. Section C examines whether re-
cent reforms proposed by the NCAA cure these due process inad-
equacies. If adopted, these proposals should alleviate the public
pressure for more reform.
A. Due Process Issues Raised During the 1978 Congressional
Hearings on NCAA Enforcement Procedures
Congress first considered complaints of NCAA unfairness and
lack of due process in 1978 when a House of Representatives
subcommittee conducted hearings to address allegations of "unfair-
ness, arbitrariness, inequality, secrecy, and other abuses of exces-
sive power.""l The subcommittee met on ten occasions to consid-
er testimony from athletic administrators, coaches, student-athletes,
professors, attorneys, and NCAA personnel. The problems most
frequently cited by witnesses challenging NCAA enforcement pro-
cedures fell into three general categories: the investigation of al-
leged violations, the limited information provided to institutions
and staff members under investigation, and the close relationship
between the enforcement staff and the Committee on Infractions.
106. Because the NCAA is not a state actor, these reforms are not required by law.
See supra Section I(A).
107. These procedures are current as of the 1992-1993 academic year. See NCAA
MANUAL, supra note 3.
108. NCAA Enforcement Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 Hearings] (statement of John E. Moss, Subcommittee
Chairman).
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The majority of complaints about the investigative process
criticized the NCAA's lack of fairness and its misuse of power. A
former NCAA enforcement representative testified that a six-week
investigation at any school could establish at least a technical
violation of the complex NCAA rules" and that the NCAA ar-
bitrarily selected schools for investigation.' There were also
claims that the NCAA often began investigations into an
institution's athletic program or interfered with a coach's employ-
ment opportunities as retaliation for challenging NCAA procedures
in court or in public."' Although the investigative process is sup-
posed to be a cooperative endeavor between the NCAA and the
member institution charged with violations, witnesses repeatedly
cited the adversarial nature of the proceedings and the dispropor-
tionate power of the NCAA."' In addition, several witnesses pre-
sented examples of misconduct by NCAA enforcement staff during
investigations, including the threatening and intimidating of wit-
nesses 1 3 and the leaking of information to the press before an in-
stitution or individual could defend itself at a hearing."' Further-
more, as there was no statute of limitations in the NCAA enforce-
ment regulations, the NCAA could decide to investigate violations
that allegedly occurred ten or twenty years prior to the investiga-
tion."5
109. lId at 27-28 (testimony of J. Brent Clark, Special Assistant, Oversight and Inves-
tigations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce).
110. The witness provided examples of how "politics and balance sheets seemed to
dictate" the NCAA's handling of cases. For example, the NCAA called off an investiga-
tion of serious allegations involving illegal representation by an agent of several athletes
at a large college, but fully pursued an investigation into minor technical violations at a
small institution. Id. at 11.
111. Id. at 8-11; see also id at 195 (testimony of Charles Butler, Bowling Green
University, and former assistant football coach at Michigan State University).
112. See, e.g., id. at 5 (testimony of J. Brent Clark); id. at 128 (testimony of Erwin
C. Ward, former counsel to Mississippi State University in proceedings before the
NCAA); id. at 219 (testimony of Dr. Frederick D. Williams, Professor of History and
Adjunct Professor of Military Science and Member of the Select Committee, Michigan
State University).
113. Id. at 218 (testimony of Dr. Frederick D. Williams); see also id. at 137-38 (testi-
mony of Bob Tyler, Head Football Coach, Mississippi State University).
114. Id at 225-26 (testimony of Dr. Frederick D. Williams); see also id. at 5 (testi-
mony of J. Brent Clark); id. at 573-74 (testimony of Lana Tyree, attorney, Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma).
115. Id. at 57 (testimony of J. Brent Clark).
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Consistent with the complaint that the NCAA did not provide
adequate due process, 16 witnesses testified that the NCAA failed
to furnish the institutions with the information necessary to con-
duct a defense."' For example, after initiating an official investi-
gation, the NCAA failed to notify the institution of the procedures
that would be followed during the investigation."' Additionally,
on several occasions the NCAA failed to provide the institution or
individual staff members with information consistent with the co-
operative nature underlying discovery principles," 9 including the
nature of the charges.2 ' Furthermore, the institutions and indi-
vidual staff members were denied the opportunity to confront their
accusers and to cross-examine witnesses.' Witnesses also criti-
cized the unavailability of complete transcripts of interviews and
hearings.'
Another recurring complaint was that the NCAA did not
provide institutions or individuals with unbiased investigations."z
For example, witnesses alleged that the hearings began with a pre-
sumption of guilt that placed the burden of proof on the charged
party, rather than on the NCAA.'24 In addition, the close work-
ing relationship between the enforcement staff (investigator and
prosecutor) and the Committee on Infractions (adjudicator) pre-
cluded fair consideration of the evidence."z Finally, as the NCAA
Council oversees the investigative process, witnesses believed that
they could not receive an unbiased tribunal, even on appeal."6
116. Id. at 219 (testimony of Dr. Frederick D. Williams).
117. Id. at 873-75 (statement of John E. Moss).
118. Id. at 809-10 (testimony of Dr. Donald H. Baepler, Chancellor, University of
Nevada System); id. at 820-21 (testimony of K. Michael Leavitt, Counsel, University of
Nevada System).
119. Id. at 824 (testimony of K. Michael Leavitt); id. at 259 (testimony of Dr. Stanley
B. Kegler, Vice President, University of Minnesota); id. at 6-7 (testimony of J. Brent
Clark).
120. Id. at 815 (testimony of Jerry Tarkanian, Head Basketball Coach, UNLV); id. at
573 (testimony of Lana Tyree).
121. lia at 260 (testimony of Dr. Stanley B. Kegler); id. at 810 (testimony of Dr.
Donald H. Baepler).
122. Id. at 826, 864-65 (testimony of K. Michael Leavitt); id. at 546 (testimony of
Lana Tyree).
123. Id at 874 (statement of John E. Moss).
124. See, e.g., id at 511 (testimony of Mickey Holmes, Commissioner, Missouri Valley
Conference).
125. Id. at 7 (testimony of J. Brent Clark); id. at 474-75, 501-02 (testimony of John
A. Fuzak, former president of the NCAA).
126. Id. at 223 (testimony of Dr. Jacob A. Hoefer, Professor of Animal Husbandry
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Unsurprisingly, NCAA staff members defended the enforce-
ment procedures in existence and denied several of the allegations.
They insisted that relations between the enforcement staff and the
Committee on Infractions were professional and that the Commit-
tee based its decisions on the facts, not on the staff's recommenda-
tions." These NCAA witnesses also asserted that investigations
and penalties were not arbitrary and that the enforcement staff
had the burden of proving the institution's guilt." In addition,
since investigating the cases that prompted the charges raised at
the hearings, the NCAA instituted reforms that alleviated some of
these complaints.' 29 For example, interviewees are now allowed
legal counsel,"° the Committee "generally observes" a four-year
statute of limitations,' and enforcement procedures are designed
to ensure a cooperative effort between NCAA enforcement staff
and member institutions. Despite such reforms, the NCAA de-
fended its refusal to provide verbatim transcripts of hearings to
protect the confidentiality of the witnesses and the investiga-
tion.'
After the hearings, the subcommittee issued a report recom-
mending a variety of reforms to NCAA enforcement proce-
dures.'34 Because the subcommittee recognized that the NCAA
and Associate Director, Michigan Agricultural Experiment Station, Michigan State Univer-
sity); id. at 547, 574-75 (testimony of Lana Tyree).
127. Id. at 1068-69 (testimony of Arthur R. Reynolds, former chairman of the Com-
mittee on Infractions, NCAA); id at 899 (testimony of J. Neils Thompson, President,
NCAA).
128. I& at 1063-68 (testimony of Arthur R. Reynolds).
129. Id. at 1059-63 (testimony of Arthur R. Reynolds); id. at 894 (testimony of J.
Neils Thompson); i&t at 1376-77 (testimony of William B. Hunt, Assistant Executive Di-
rector, Enforcement Program, NCAA).
130. I& at 895 (testimony of J. Neils Thompson); see NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3,
arts. 32.3.5, 32.6.4, 32.8.3.
131. 1978 Hearings, supra note 108, at 896 (testimony of J. Neils Thompson); see
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 32.5.2. However, the statute of limitations provision
does not apply to allegations affecting the eligibility of a current student-athlete,
"indicat[ing] a pattern of willful violations . . . which began before but continued into the
four-year period." In addition, the statute of limitations is one year for cases involving "a
blatant disregard for the Association's fundamental . .. regulations or . . . an effort to
conceal the occurrence of the violation." Id
132. 1978 Hearings, supra note 108, at 900 (testimony of J. Neils Thompson); id at
1376 (testimony of William B. Hunt).
133. Id. at 897-98 (testimony of J. Neils Thompson).
134. See generally H.R. REP. No. 69, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter H.R.
REP. No. 69].
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should impose its own reforms, the report suggested that the
NCAA form a "blue ribbon panel" to evaluate the recommenda-
tions generated by the hearings.13 Such recommendations includ-
ed increasing the information available to the institutions and
individuals under investigation,136 separating the functions of the
enforcement staff from those of the Committee of Infractions, 37
and implementing a formal statute of limitations on initiating and
concluding investigations.138
In January 1979, the NCAA Convention rejected two propos-
als to overhaul the NCAA's enforcement system and to conduct a
year-long evaluation of this reform plan.39 Although both propos-
als reflected recommendations suggested during the congressional
hearings, they were independent of the subcommittee's report.
140
Because many of the recommendations were already incorporated
into NCAA enforcement procedures, the Convention approved
measures to "'clarify' that these are existing practices." 4' In addi-
tion, the Convention instituted a formal "four-year statute of limi-
tations on investigations.' 1 42  Despite these measures, Congress
was unappeased; an additional congressional hearing in July 1979
made clear that the NCAA would be closely scrutinized to ensure
that it complied with the subcommittee recommendations.43
135. Id. at 58; see also Nancy Scannell, NCAA Threatened with Federal Law, WASH.
POST, Jan. 9, 1979, at D1. However, the "minority called the year-long investigation 'a
waste of time.'" Id.
136. H.R. REP. NO. 69, supra note 134, at 25-26, 41 (recommendations that all par-
ties should have access to information used at hearings, enforcement staff should inform
parties of all accusations and when their interests may be adversely affected, and the
NCAA should provide access to complete transcripts of hearings).
137. ld. at 26, 40-41, 51 (recommendations that the Committee on Infractions should
not supervise the enforcement staff's investigation or prepare the infractions report and
that the enforcement staff should not determine penalties).
138. Id. at 26-67.
139. Nancy Scannell, NCAA Rejects Reform Plan, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 1979, at C1.
Burton Brody, a law professor at the University of Denver, and ten colleagues sponsored
the proposal, which recommended "alter[ing] the relationship between the NCAA investi-
gator-prosecutor '(enforcement staff) and the judge (infractions committee)." Stephen
Horn, the president of Long Beach State University, sponsored the proposal for a year-
long review of the Brody plan to study its legal repercussions. Id.
140. Id
141. Id
142, Id.
143. NCAA Action Scrutinized, WASH. POST, July 13, 1979, at C3. Issues unresolved
at that time included access to hearing transcripts and sharing of information between the
NCAA and the institution under investigation. Id.
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Although the NCAA did not adopt all of the Congressional
recommendations, it did institute some reforms in response to the
hearings and the challenges to its procedures. Nevertheless, these
reforms have not prevented continuing criticisms of NCAA en-
forcement procedures. The next Section analyzes current NCAA
procedures in light of the problems identified in the 1978 hearings
and considers whether these procedures currently comply with
traditional due process requirements.
B. Current NCAA Enforcement Regulations
Since the 1978 Congressional hearings, the NCAA has insti-
tuted gradual reforms to eliminate many of the sources of the due
process complaints. This Section reviews current NCAA enforce-
ment regulations and demonstrates that, although they comply with
most basic due process standards, they do not satisfy all of the
requirements. However, by eliminating or merely explaining these
due process deficiencies, the NCAA could reduce the external
pressure for reform by alleviating the public's perception that
NCAA enforcement regulations are unfair and arbitrary and fail to
provide due process protection.1"
1. NCAA Enforcement Regulations. Article 19 of the
NCAA Manual establishes the duties of the committee charged
with administering the Association's enforcement program, the
procedures to be followed, and the penalties to be imposed. The
six-member Committee on Infractions, appointed by the NCAA
Council, is responsible for administering the NCAA enforcement
program."5 The Committee on Infractions may impose disciplin-
ary or corrective actions without seeking further approval, except
in cases of major violations, suspensions, or terminations of
membership."6 Responsibilities of the Committee include: con-
144. See, e.g., Alison Muscatine, NCAA Urged to Modify Inquiries; Special Committee
Proposes New Steps, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1991, at El; Intercollegiate Sports: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer Protection, and Competitiveness of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 58-61 (1991) [hereinafter
1991 Hearings] (statement of James E. King, Florida State Representative); id. at 52-54
(statement of Don Yaeger, author of UNDUE PROCESS (1991)); id.-at 31-37 (statement of
Jery Tarkanian, Head Basketball Coach, UNLV). But see id. at 12-16 (statement of
David P. Roselle, President, University of Delaware, and former president of the Univer-
sity of Kentucky).
145. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 19.1.
146. Id art. 19.1.2 (stating that "cases involving major violations .. . shall be subject
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sidering complaints that member institutions violated NCAA aca-
demic or athletic standards; determining the facts connected with
such alleged violation and deciding whether such violations oc-
curred; imposing appropriate penalties; and formulating and revis-
ing a statement of the Committee's operating procedures. 147 Be-
fore any penalties are imposed on a member institution, the Com-
mittee must provide the institution with notice of the alleged viola-
tions, "the opportunity to appear before the committee and the
opportunity to appeal the committee's findings of major violations
or penalties. 14
The degree of notice provided to a member institution de-
pends on the severity of the alleged violations.149 Any member
institution under investigation receives "[n]otice of any specific
charges against it and the facts upon which such charges are
based."1" A member institution charged with secondary violations
is afforded the opportunity to respond to the charges by writing to
the assistant executive director for enforcement.151 For charges of
major violations, a member institution may appear before the
Committee on Infractions to challenge the allegations with sup-
porting evidence."
The NCAA enforcement regulations also distinguish between
secondary violations and major violations in imposing penalties.
The assistant executive director for enforcement and the Commit-
tee on Infractions may impose penalties from a list of suggested
penalties, based on the severity of the violations, the number of
violations, and other mitigating factors. 53 However, certain mini-
to review by the Council on appeal").
147. Id. art. 19.1.3.
148. Id. art. 19.2.1.
149. There are two types of violations. A secondary violation is an isolated event
which provides "limited recruiting or competitive advantage." All other violations are
major violations, especially if they provide "an extensive recruiting or competitive advan-
tage." In addition, the assistant executive director for enforcement may reclassify repeated
incidents of minor violations as major violations. Id. art. 19.02.2.
150. Id. art. 19.3.
151. Id. art. 19,3.2 (the institution may appear before the Committee on Infractions
on appeal).
152. Id. art. 19.3.1.
153. There are six suggested penalties for secondary violations, including terminating
the recruitment of a prospect or the eligibility of a student-athlete; forfeiting athletic con-
tests; prohibiting a coach from off-campus recruitment for a year; imposing a fine ranging
from $500 to $5,000; reducing a maximum of 20% of financial aid awards; and recertify-
ing that the institution's policies conform to NCAA regulations. Id. art. 19.4.1. Suggested
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mum penalties exist for major violations.1" In addition, the
Committee must impose the "death penalty" if it finds that an
institution has committed a major violation within five years from
the start of a previous penalty for a major violation. 5 Other
than a written appeal to the Council division steering committee
representing the institution's division or the Committee on Infrac-
tions,"6 there is no vehicle for review of the Committee's findings
unless new evidence surfaces or prejudicial procedural error is
shown."
Article 32 of the NCAA Manual specifies the details of the
NCAA's enforcement policies and procedures. The article covers
preliminary review of information,58 investigative procedures, 59
penalties for major violations are more numerous and include: probation; ineligibility for
post-season tournaments and meets; denial of television coverage; reduction in financial
aid awards; requirement to "show cause" why penalties should not be imposed if the
institution does not take the appropriate disciplinary action against the involved person-
nel; and the return of proceeds gained from competitions involving an ineligible athlete.
Id. art. 19.4.2.1.
154. Id. art. 19.4.2.2. These required penalties include: two years of probation; "[t]he
elimination of all expense-paid recruiting visits to the institution in the involved sport for
one recruiting year;" denial of off-campus recruiting activities in the involved sport; termi-
nation or reassignment of all institutional staff members who knowingly engaged in or
condoned a major violation; one year of sanctions denying participation in post-season
events and television broadcasts; and recertification that the institution's current proce-
dures conform to NCAA regulations. Under extenuating circumstances, the Committee
does not have to impose these penalties. Id.
155. Id art. 19.4.2.3. The "death penalty" prohibits coaching or competition in the
latest involved sport and eliminates all new grants-in-aid awards for that sport for two
years. There are also forfeitures of the institution's voting rights and committee positions
in the NCAA for four years. Id.
156. An institution may appeal, in writing, the violations found and/or the penalties
imposed on behalf of itself,, a staff member, or a student-athlete. Id. art. 19.5.
157. Id art. 19.4.2.8.1.
158. The enforcement staff investigates and reviews information concerning possible
violations to determine whether there are enough facts to warrant further inquiry and
whether the alleged violation is major or secondary. The staff must also provide the
institution with notification of the preliminary investigation, the relevant procedures that
will be followed, and a status report every six months. Id art. 32.2.
159. This provision details the procedures for conducting interviews of institutional
staff members and student-athletes. If a witness may divulge information that could be
detrimental to his interest, the enforcement representative must inform the individual of
the purpose of the interview and the witness may be represented by counsel. The inter-
view reports are confidential but may be reviewed by the witnesses to ensure accuracy.
An institutional representative may attend any portion of the interviews that directly
relate to the institution, but will not receive a copy of the interview report. Id. art. 32.3.
In 1991, the Committee on Infractions, in response to complaints of contradictory
information and a lack of reliable records, amended article 32.3.8 to instruct enforcement
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processing information," the official inquiry,16' hearings before
the Committee on Infractions," notification of Committee ac-
tion, 63 and appeals." After allegations are made against an in-
dividual or member institution, the Committee on Infractions con-
trols the entire process, from the initial information-gathering
through the hearing and penalty assessment.165 Moreover, under
representatives to record interviews when possible and to permit handwritten notes by all
involved parties. Id. art. 32.3.8. The mechanical recordings will be treated the same as
written reports and will therefore remain confidential and unavailable to individuals or
institutions requesting information on the case. See id. art. 32.3.9.
The enforcement staff is evaluating the results to determine whether taping inter-
views will inhibit witnesses. Enforcement Staff Continues to Tape Interviews in Cases,
NCAA NEWS, July 17, 1991, at 1, 20; see also University of Nev. v. Tarkanian, 594 P.2d
1159, 1161 (Nev. 1979) (claiming that the only record of witness interviews was derived
from oral reports of staff investigators' recollections of interviews).
160. If an institution initiates corrective action in response to a violation, the Com-
mittee on Infractions or the assistant director for enforcement may decide not to impose
further penalties. If the corrective action is insufficient, the enforcement staff must notify
the institution of additional penalties for secondary violations or file an official inquiry
for major violations. Furthermore, the Committee considers self-disclosure by the institu-
tion as a mitigating factor in determining penalties. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, art.
32.4.
161. If the enforcement staff decides that allegations warrant investigation, the staff
must provide the institution with a letter of official inquiry that explains the scope of the
inquiry, describes the allegations, identifies the involved individuals, and requests disclo-
sure of all relevant information. At the time the official inquiry is filed, the staff must
suggest a date for the institution to meet with the Committee on Infractions and provide
notice of the hearing procedures. In addition, the staff must prepare a case summary that
the institution may review before the hearing. Id. art. 32.5.
162. An institution has the opportunity to appear before the Committee to present
facts in a major case or to appeal a decision in a secondary violation case. The Commit-
tee expects requested individuals to appear in person, with legal counsel if desired. This
hearing is comprised of a case summary, opening statements by the institution and the
enforcement staff, staff presentation, institution presentation, and closing statements by
the institution and the enforcement staff. The Committee may exclude irrelevant, immate-
rial, or repetitious information and may question witnesses. The hearing will be tape
recorded but the institution may not receive a copy of the tape or a transcript of the
hearing. After the hearing, the Committee rules on each alleged violation and assesses
any penalties. Id. art. 32.6.
163. The Committee must promptly provide the institution with an infractions report
explaining its findings and any penalties. After the institution receives the report, it may
be released to the media, with names of individuals deleted. Id. art. 32.7.
164. An institution or individual staff member may appeal to the appropriate steering
division of the NCAA Council within fifteen days of receipt of the Committee's report.
The Council will grant the appeal if the finding is contrary to the evidence, a violation
of NCAA rules did not occur, or a procedural error affected the reliability of informa-
tion. Id. art. 32.8. The appeal may be in person or in writing. The Council's decision is
final and is not subject to further review. IeL art. 32.9.
165. This organizational structure is the source of the critics' largest due process com-
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the regulations, charged parties have no right to cross-examine wit-
nesses or to receive the interview reports and transcripts.166
2. Due Process Analysis of Current NCAA Enforcement
Regulations. This subsection examines current NCAA en-
forcement regulations against factors typically required for due
process in administrative proceedings. First, Judge Friendly's list of
procedures required for fair administrative proceedings is applied
to NCAA regulations to identify specific due process standards
that have been satisfied.6  Then, in areas where due process stan-
dards have not been satisfied, the Mathews balancing test" will
be applied to determine if the NCAA should provide the missing
due process protection. Although NCAA regulations satisfy six
important due process requirements, the NCAA could comply with
three additional requirements with minimal administrative costs.
Two due process requirements, however, would be too costly to
administer and would not be worth implementing.
a. NCAA enforcement regulations satisfy six of Judge
Friendly's due process requirements. Current NCAA enforcement
regulations satisfy six of the due process requirements identified by
Judge Friendly:69 notice of the proposed action and the grounds
asserted for it; an opportunity to present reasons why the pro-
posed action should not be taken; the right to know opposing
evidence; a decision based exclusively on the evidence presented;
an opportunity to be represented by counsel; and a requirement
that the tribunal prepare written findings of fact and reasons for
the decision.
plaint-the lack of a neutral adjudicator. See supra text accompanying notes 123-26.
166. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 32.3.9, 32.6.5, 32.6.5.8. The NCAA de-
fends this policy, stating that the hearings are not meant to mirror a court case and that
the NCAA does not have the authority to subpoena witnesses. Muscatine, supra note
144, at El.
167. Friendly, supra note 92, at 1279-94; see supra text accompanying note 91. The
elements identified by Judge Friendly as necessary for a fair hearing are relevant in de-
termining the necessary elements of fair NCAA investigative procedures.
168. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see supra text accompanying note
101.
169. See supra text accompanying note 91. Because Judge Friendly questioned the
suitability of adding to litigation by requiring judicial review, this requirement will not be
discussed. See Friendly, supra note 92, at 1294-95.
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NCAA enforcement regulations satisfy the requirement of
providing institutions with notice of the proposed action and the
grounds asserted."' The enforcement staff must notify an institu-
tion of preliminary investigations that are likely to require further
inquiry and must provide status reports every six months.' Addi-
tionally, if the enforcement staff determines that a full investiga-
tion is necessary, it must submit to the institution a Letter of Offi-
cial Inquiry that identifies the allegations, factual basis for the
charges, and individuals charged."
Further, NCAA regulations grant institutions the opportunity
to present reasons why the proposed action should not be tak-
en. 73 An institution may respond to secondary violations in writ-
ing and to major violations or appeals of secondary penalties at a
hearing before the Committee on Infractions;74 and it may ap-
peal major violations to the NCAA Council."5
Although NCAA regulations do not incorporate traditional
discovery rules, they provide institutions with the right to know
opposing evidence 76 by requiring the disclosure of all facts that
corroborate or refute the allegations."7 In addition, an institution
receives a copy of the summary statement of the case and has the
opportunity to "review in the NCAA national office those memo-
randums and documents upon which the enforcement staff will
rely. ,,78
Furthermore, only evidence presented at hearings before the
Committee on Infractions has an impact on the resolutions of
NCAA investigative proceedings. 79 Committee findings are based
exclusively on the credible and persuasive evidence presented at
170. See Friendly, supra note 92, at 1280-81.
171. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 32.2.2.4.
172. Id. arts. 32.5.1, 19.3.
173. See Friendly, supra note 92, at 1281.
174. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 19.3, 32.6.2.
175. Id art. 32.9.
176. See Friendly, supra note 92, at 1283.
177. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 32.5.8.
178. Id art. 32.5.10. Nevertheless, it is difficult to effectively review the information
and prepare a defense without possessing copies of the opposing information. Addi-
tionally, institutions not located near the NCAA's national headquarters in Kansas will
likely have to make several expensive trips there.
179. See Friendly, supra note 92, at 1287.
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such hearings.1" If the Committee requests additional informa-
tion, both sides may be present.8
Moreover, NCAA regulations provide, for most involved
parties, the opportunity to be represented by counsel." All par-
ties questioned during an interview that may "develop information
detrimental to the [individuals'] interests" may be represented by
legal counsel." In addition, individuals testifying at the request
of the Committee may bring legal counsel to the hearing."  An
institution is also permitted to have legal counsel in attendance at
the hearing."
NCAA regulations also require that the tribunal prepare
written findings of fact and reasons for its decisions:86 Before any
public announcement, the Committee on Infractions or the en-
forcement staff must prepare an Infractions Report. This report
"contain[s] a consolidated statement of all penalties, corrective
actions, requirements, and other conditions and obligations of
membership imposed upon a member institution found in violation
of NCAA legislation."'"
b. Balancing test analysis of Judge Friendly's due process
requirements not satisfied by NCAA enforcement regula-
tions. Current NCAA regulations do not afford due process pro-
tection in five of the areas identified by Judge Friendly. These
missing elements are: an unbiased tribunal; the right to call wit-
nesses; the right to cross-examine witnesses; a requirement that the
tribunal prepare a record of the evidence presented; and an open
hearing.
First, the investigative procedures and the close working rela-
tionship between the Committee on Infractions and the enforce-
180. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 32.6.6.2. The Committee conducts its deliber-
ations in private, without the presence of the enforcement staff. Id. art. 32.6.6.
181. Id. art. 32.6.6.1. This requirement prevents the Committee from requesting addi-
tional information or clarification from the enforcement staff without the institution or
individual being able to defend itself.
182. See Friendly, supra note 92, at 1287-91.
183. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 32.3.5.
184. Id. art. 32.6.4.1.
185. Id. art. 32.6.4.2.
186. See Friendly, supra note 92, at 1291-92.
187. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 32.7.1. Moreover, after an appeal, the Com-
mittee or the NCAA Council must submit an Expanded Infractions Report containing
similar information. Id. art. 32.8.5.
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ment staff do not appear to provide institutions and charged indi-
viduals with an unbiased tribunal."'s The Committee on Infrac-
tions administers the NCAA enforcement program.189 Its
responsibilities include considering initial complaints filed against a
member, conducting hearings for major violations, weighing the
evidence related to alleged violations, imposing penalties for sec-
ondary and major violations, and hearing appeals of secondary
violations."9 The enforcement staff operates under the guidance
of the Committee on Infractions.' Its duties include gathering
basic information, handling minor violations through correspon-
dence, selecting matters for full investigation, and consulting with
the Committee when procedural questions arise." The en-
forcement staff is also responsible for conducting the investigation
and presenting the evidence during the hearing before the Com-
mittee."9 Moreover, the enforcement staff may prepare the In-
fractions Report at the request of the Committee.94
The Committee on Infractions, responsible for weighing the
evidence and imposing penalties, supervises the enforcement staff
that gathers the evidence and presents the NCAA's case at the
hearing. This close working relationship between the decisionmaker
and the investigator/prosecutor gives the impression that the out-
come is decided before the hearing occurs-that is, it appears un-
likely that an unbiased tribunal weighs the testimony of both sides.
Indeed, as all members of the Committee on Infractions and en-
forcement staff are affiliated with the NCAA, investigative proce-
dures should provide more "procedural formality" than "if the
decisionmaker were not a member."'95
The Mathews balancing test96 is helpful in deciding whether
the NCAA should adopt reforms that create a less biased tribunal.
Because current procedures create a public perception of impropri-
188. See Friendly, supra note 92, at 1279-80.
189. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 19.1.
190. Id. art. 19.1.3.
191. Id. art. 32.2.2.
192. Id. art. 32.2.2.1.
193. Id. arts. 32.3, 32.6.5.
194. Id. art. 32.7.1.
195. See Friendly, supra note 92, at 1279.
196. See supra text accompanying note 101. In general, the test weighs "the impor-
tance of the individual liberty or property interest" and the possibility of reducing erro-
neous judgments against the increased administrative costs. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra
note 45, § 13.8, at 531.
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ety, especially if the decision favors the NCAA, the institution or
individual under investigation appears to be at risk of losing the
liberty and property interests at stake in the case.1" Separating
the investigator and the adjudicator should dispel the appearance
of collaboration and should convince the public that erroneous
judgments are less likely to occur because the decision is based on
evidence presented, rather than on predetermined opinions. More-
over, unbiased tribunals are less likely to deliver erroneous judg-
ments.
It is true that the administration of an unbiased tribunal
would be complicated and would require substantial administrative
and personnel changes. 198 Nevertheless, the most prominent com-
plaints against the NCAA have been the inherent unfairness and
arbitrariness of the enforcement process. " Individuals and institu-
tions frustrated by the outcome of an NCAA investigation, often
blame the "unfairness" of the process, rather than acknowledge
violations of NCAA rules. Because it is likely that challenges to
NCAA regulations would dramatically decrease if it appeared that
subjects under investigations were treated fairly, the NCAA should
incur the increased administrative costs and create an unbiased
tribunal.'
In addition to falling short of the requirements for an unbi-
ased tribunal, NCAA enforcement regulations fail to meet several
informational due. process requirements."' For example, NCAA
regulations do not provide institutions with the right to cross-ex-
amine the enforcement staff's witnesses.' Similarly, NCAA regu-
lations do not grant the right to present complete evidence since
197. Examples are the institution's freedom of association and right to revenues, the
individual's right to employment, and the student-athlete's right to participate in athletic
competitions. For a more detailed discussion on the institution's, individual's, and student-
athlete's liberty and property rights, see supra subsection I(B)(1).
198. For example, the NCAA would have to identify independent personnel with
knowledge of administrative hearings and NCAA rules. In addition, to ensure that this
independent staff has minimal contact with the enforcement staff or Committee on Infrac-
tions, the NCAA would need to reorganize the infractions staff and reassign functions.
199. See supra Section II(A).
200. Moreover, because public perception, not legal requirements, spearheads the push
for NCAA reform, solving the most prominent complaint should be worth the extra
effort and cost.
201. Lack of information has also been a recurring due process complaint. See supra
Section II(A).
202. See Friendly, supra note 92, at 1283-86; see also NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3,
art. 32.6.5.
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they do not include the right to call all relevant witnesses."° Al-
though institutions have the right to present evidence 4 and to
request the presence of its representatives during the hearing be-
fore the Committee on Infractions, 5 the institutions' witnesses
are limited to officials, legal counsel, and those individuals identi-
fied by the enforcement staff.' Moreover, parties under inves-
tigation do not have adequate access to the tribunal's record of
the evidence presented.' The Committee on Infractions's record
of the hearing-a tape recording-is the only permissible verbatim
record. Although parties may review the relevant sections of the
tape, they may not receive or make a copy of the tape or a verba-
tim transcript of the hearing.2" Finally, NCAA hearings are not
currently open to the public and therefore do not satisfy the due
process requirement of an open hearing.'
Consideration of these four requirements under the Mathews
balancing test indicates that although reforms in these areas would
improve the fairness of the investigative procedures, only two of
these requirements are worth the administrative costs. Having the
opportunity to call all relevant witnesses, to review the complete
record of the hearing, to cross-examine witnesses, and to partici-
pate in an open hearing would provide parties under investigation
with more complete information than do current procedures. This
access to relevant information would lead to more effective defens-
es against the allegations, either at the initial hearing or on appeal;
consequently, the parties' property and liberty interests would be
better protected. Although complying with these requirements
would not guarantee a favorable outcome for the parties under
investigation or eliminate erroneous suits,'1° the administrative
costs of providing an opportunity to call all revevant witnesses and
203. See Friendly, supra note 92, at 1282.
204. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 32.6.5.
205: I& art. 32.6.2.
206. Id. art. 32.6.4.2. Denying this right to call witnesses should be limited to instanc-
es where there is a "substantial . . . interest in preserving the overall integrity of insti-
tutions and programs . . . and there is a substantial chance that the individual may be
more interested in disruption than in proving his case." Friendly, supra note 92, at 1282
n.80.
207. See Friendly, supra note 92, at 1291-92.
208. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 32.6.5.8.
209. See Friendly, supra note 92, at 1293-94. For an evaluation of proposed reforms
that would provide public hearings, see infra Section I(C)Q.
210. Althofigh the public may perceive these factors to affect the results, other vari-
ables, such as the strength of a case, could have a greater impact on the outcome.
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complete hearing transcripts would likely be modest. Accordingly,
the NCAA should reform its current procedures to provide parties
under investigation with the rights to call relevant witnesses and to
access and review adequately the complete hearing record; these
procedures will increase the fairness of the investigative proceed-
ings without creating substantial administrative problems.
Allowing parties to cross-examine witnesses, however, would
be more difficult, because the NCAA does not have the power to
subpoena witnesses."' Furthermore, because cross-examinations
tend to be utilized as a delay tactic, courts have been willing to
dispense with the requirement in many cases."' Providing open
hearings is also unfeasible.2 3 Although allowing public attendance
could protect the liberty and property interests of charged institu-
tions and individuals and reduce the risk of erroneous judg-
ments,2"4 the administrative costs are too great to warrant imple-
mentation. For example, NCAA facilities are not equipped to
handle the number of people that would try to attend hearings, es-
pecially when they involve well-known and controversial parties,
such as Jerry Tarkanian and UNLV. Accommodating this public
interest and implementing procedures similar to those utilized by
courts during high-profile trials would require enlarging the NCAA
staff. NCAA investigations often involve high-profile sports pro-
grams that are frequently featured in newspaper and television
stories, capturing the public's attention. This disproportionate
amount of publicity surrounding NCAA proceedings enhances the
negative effects of open hearings, distinguishing them from most
other administrative proceedings.21
211. Witnesses, who currently testify voluntarily, might be unwilling to appear at a
hearing if they have to be subjected to the unpleasantness of cross-examinations.
212. Friendly, supra note 92, at 1284-86. Other disadvantages to requiring cross-exam-
inations are the reluctance of witnesses to testify, "undue exacerbation," and "polariza-
tion" of continuing relationships. Situations where courts did not require cross-examina-
tions include prisoner cases, discipline of students, and eviction proceedings. Id. at 1286.
213. For reaction to proposed NCAA reforms that would provide for open hearings,
see infra notes 232, 237-38 and accompanying text.
214. Open hearings could result in NCAA proceedings that appear to be fairer than
current hearings. Public attendance at trials theoretically provides due process by fostering
confidence in the proceeding, assuring the accuracy of the evidence, and ensuring that
officials conduct fair proceedings. Friendly, supra note 92, at 1293 n.132.
215. These negative effects include intimidating some witnesses, providing incentives to
other witnesses for "hamming it up," attaching greater stigma to parties ultimately found
innocent, and providing too much publicity for the NCAA's "dirty laundry."
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Based on Judge Friendly's list and the Mathews balancing
test, the NCAA should adopt reforms to provide charged parties
with an unbiased tribunal, the right to call witnesses, and the op-
portunity to review a complete record of the hearing. It is not
currently feasible, however, for the NCAA to guarantee the right
to cross-examination or to provide open hearings. Because the
deficiencies in these areas drive the push for reform, the NCAA
should adopt the reforms that are feasible and should clearly ex-
plain to the public, the member institutions, coaches, and student-
athletes why it should not have to satisfy the remaining due pro-
cess requirements. The next Section discusses recent proposals for
NCAA reform and analyzes whether they cure the due process
deficiencies identified in this Section.
C. Evaluation of the NCAA's Proposed Reforms
As discussed in the previous section, due process problems
remain despite the NCAA's efforts to reform its enforcement
procedures since the 1978 congressional hearings. In response to
legislative action by Congress and several states,216 the NCAA
formed a special committee in 1991 to analyze its enforcement
provisions.217 The committee, headed by Rex Lee, president of
Brigham Young University and a former U.S. Solicitor General,
focused on the implications of implementing due process
requirements.218 As the eleven-member committee combined for-
mer judges, including former United States Supreme Court Chief
Justice Warren Burger, with academic and athletic administrators,
it could develop recommendations to address due process concerns
while it retained the NCAA's regulatory position.21 9
216. See discussion infra Part III.
217. NCAA Executive Director Richard D. Schultz proposed the creation of the
special committee to ensure that the enforcement process is "fair, effective, timely and
consistent." Committee Releases Enforcement-Review Report, NCAA NEWS, Nov. 4, 1991,
at 12.
218. Danny Robbins, Enforcement Power of NCAA to Be Topic for State Legislature,
L.A. TIMES, May 12, 1991, at C3. According to Lee, "the group's three objectives were
to keep the NCAA's enforcement effort fair while maintaining its effectiveness, to pro-
vide a uniform structure that would be the same in all states, and to assure that the
system would be based on cooperation between the institution and the NCAA." Enforce-
ment Panel Issues Report, NCAA NEWS, Nov. 4, 1991, at 1.
219. The other nine members of the committee were Reuben V. Anderson, former
Mississippi State Supreme Court Judge; Charles Cavagnaro, Director of Athletics, Mem-
phis State University, and a member of the NCAA Council; Benjamin R. Civiletti, for-
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On October 28, 1991, the special committee recommended
eleven dramatic changes to the NCAA enforcement process.'
Although some of the proposals addressed due process concerns,
others made suggestions that would generally improve NCAA
enforcement -procedures. For example, the most innovative propos-
al called for the creation of a summary disposition process to
settle cases quickly through cooperative action between the NCAA
and the institution under investigation." Under this plan, the two
sides would be able to share information and agree upon a state-
ment of the facts, negotiate findings of violations, and propose
penalties.m By curtailing the number of full hearings, this pro-
posal would reduce the effect of the "biased tribunals."' m Anoth-
er important proposal provided that if the NCAA and the institu-
tion were unable to negotiate a resolution during the summary-dis-
position process, an independent hearing officer would review the
facts and propose penalties.' This change would create an unbi-
ased tribunal and would alleviate public criticism that the Commit-
tee on Infractions is both prosecutor and judge.' The special
committee stressed this goal, stating that the Committee on Infrac-
mer U.S. Attorney General; Charles W. Ehrhardt, Professor of Law and Faculty Athletics
Representative, Florida State University; Becky R. French, University Counsel, North
Carolina State University; Charles Renfrew, Vice President, Legal, Chevron Corp., former
federal district judge, and former Deputy U.S. Attorney General; William M. Sangster,
Director of International Programs and Faculty Athletics Representative, Georgia Institute
of Technology, and a member of the NCAA Council; Philip W. Tone, former federal dis-
trict and federal circuit court judge; and Paul R. Verkuil, President, College of William
and Mary, and a former dean of Tulane Law School. Committee Releases Enforcement-
Review Report, supra note 217, at 12.
220. Michael Janofsky, N.C.A.A.'s Panel Recommends Updated Rules for Investigations,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1991, at B9.
221. The objective behind this recommendation was to reduce the time devoted to an
investigation, thereby lessening the amount of adverse publicity and more efficiently utiliz-
ing institution and NCAA resources. Committee Releases Enforcement-Review Report,
supra note 217, at 13.
222. Id. This proposal would foster a cooperative environment and a proceeding that
is expected to last no longer than three or four months. Id.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 188-200.
224. Committee Releases Enforcement-Review Report, supra note 217, at 13. The com-
mittee recommended that the hearing officer "be a former Federal judge, state court
judge, or other eminent legal authority or person of stature whose integrity and impar-
tiality are beyond question." Id. In addition, the NCAA Administrative Committee should
select and supervise a pool of officers who would receive training on NCAA regulations
and procedures. Id.
225. Id. This recommendation should also improve the public's perception of and
confidence in the fairness of the enforcement process. Id
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tions would serve as the supervisor of the investigation and the
summary disposition process, not as "the hearing panel to deter-
mine the facts in a case. 22 6
The special committee also recommended several proposals to
improve the availability of information to institutions and the pub-
lic.' It endorsed supplying transcripts or tape recordings of
NCAA hearings and interviews to all appropriate involved
parties;- providing greater access to information so as to allow
parties under investigation to present better defenses and obtain
fairer hearings; and opening hearings to the public so as to enable
the NCAA to communicate to the public the reasons behind de-
cisions, thereby lessening the public perception that the NCAA
imposes penalties arbitrarily. 9 The other five proposals were also
aimed at guaranteeing fair procedures and improving the efficiency
and cooperative nature of the proceedings." °
The NCAA Council has agreed to sponsor legislation at the
1993 NCAA Convention consistent with nine of the eleven special
committee recommendations. 1 However, the Council declined to
support legislation on utilizing independent hearing officers and
conducting open hearings.2 Although these two proposals will
226. Id. at 14. The other duties of the Committee on Infractions would be: reviewing
penalty agreements; considering appeals; assessing penalties based on the hearing officer's
recommendation; and monitoring the enforcement process. ad.
227. Muscatine, supra note 144, at El.
228. Committee Releases Enforcement-Review Report, supra note 217, at 13. The spe-
cial committee believed that these changes would foster a cooperative environment and
enhance the reliability of the evidence. Id
229. To improve further the public's perception of NCAA enforcement practices, the
special committee proposed expanding the reporting of infractions cases. Id. at 14.
230. The remaining recommendations included: ensuring personal visits by enforce-
ment staff to deliver the preliminary notice of inquiry; providing a special appeal council
of representatives of NCAA member institutions and conferences; adopting a formal
conflict-of-interest policy; preparing compilations of previous committee decisions; and
studying the structure and procedures of the enforcement staff. Id. at 12-14. The provi-
sion on open hearings was the only recommendation on which the special committee was
closely divided. Id. at 13.
231. Council to Sponsor Institutional Certification Plan, NCAA NEWS, Aug. 19, 1992,
at 18. Because the members must receive notice of proposed changes at least ninety days
prior to consideration, a vote could not have occurred at the 1992 Convention and
therefore had to wait until the 1993 Convention. Janofsky, supra note 220, at B9.
232. Council to Sponsor Institutional Certification Plan, supra note 231, at 18. Nev-
ertheless, the Council agreed to sponsor an amendment that would add independent in-
dividuals to the Committee on Infractions. The proposed arpendment specifies that the
Committee's size would increase by two and that the two new members would be select-
ed from legal authorities outside the NCAA. Council Minutes, Meeting August 5-7, 1992,
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not be approved at the 1993 Convention, their eventual implemen-
tation remains possible. 3  These reforms would reduce the due
process criticisms of NCAA regulations, yet their implementation
may not be easy; for example, although it would be important to
achieve the goalse of the summary disposition process, it may be
difficult to coordinate the activities of the NCAA staff and the
institution to conduct a joint investigation."
Unsurprisingly, the two proposals that the Council chose not
to sponsor would be the most difficult to implement. First, it
would be difficult and costly to locate and train qualified indepen-
dent hearing officers. Moreover, because the "independent" officer
would be supervised by NCAA officials and would work with
enforcement staff on numerous cases, the same close relationship
that currently exists between the enforcement staff and the Com-
mittee on Infractions would perhaps be extended to include the
"independent" officer. Second, opening the hearings to the public
may not be worth the costs." In fact, given the dissension within
the NCAA on whether the proposal would improve or impede the
proceedings, it is unclear whether this proposal will ever be adopt-
ed.' Besides, other special committee proposals satisfy the goal
of "mak[ing] the process more positive and understandable to
those involved and the general public.""5  Nevertheless, to im-
NCAA NEWs, Sept. 14, 1992, at 11. Although this recommendation recognizes the need
for independent oversight of the NCAA enforcement process, it is unlikely that two out
of eight independent committee members will convince the public and the NCAA mem-
bership that the tribunal is unbiased.
233. The NCAA Council has agreed to continue reviewing these two issues. Council
to Sponsor Institutional Certification Plan, supra note 231, at 18.
234. The main objectives are to shorten the timeframe of an investigation and to
reduce the amount of adverse publicity. Committee Releases Enforcement-Review Report,
supra note 217, at 13.
235. While a cooperative endeavor is more efficient, the interests of the NCAA and
the institution under investigation are inherently different. In addition, individuals impli-
cated by the violations will have other interests at stake. A better procedure might be to
conduct independent investigations with full discovery rights and joint interviews of wit-
nesses.
236. See supra notes 213-15 and accompanying text. Most courts do not require open
hearings in administrative proceedings. Friendly, supra note 92, at 1293-94.
237. Open Hearings Face an Uncertain Future, NCAA NEWS, June 24, 1992, at 18.
For example, while D. Alan Williams, faculty representative at the University of Virginia
and chair of the Committee on Infractions, believes that open hearings would "wreak
havoc" on the proceedings and would limit the candor of those testifying, Rex E. Lee,
president of Brigham Young University and chair of the special committee, argues that
the gain in public confidence resulting from open hearings would be worth the cost. Id.
238. Committee Releases Enforcement-Review Report, supra note 217, at 12. These
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prove the public's opinion of the fairness of the NCAA's enforce-
ment procedures, the NCAA should explain clearly, in a variety of
media sources, a decision not to implement these two proposals.
By adopting at its 1993 Convention legislation that imple-
ments nine of the special committee's recommended proposals, the
NCAA should improve the fairness of its enforcement procedures
and the public's impression of the fairness of the NCAA. The
proposals addressed most of the concerns discussed in subsection
II(B)(2). Because the NCAA does not have subpoena power, the
special committee did not recommend allowing the accused party
to cross-examine witnesses. 9 At the same time, many of the oth-
er proposed reforms, such as the summary disposition process, go
beyond traditional due process requirements in attempting to im-
prove the openness of the hearings and the public's perception of
the NCAA.24
III. WHO SHOULD RULE COLLEGIATE ATHLETICS?
Although NCAA regulations and the proposed amendments
to the regulations generally satisfy the legal requirements of due
process, several states and Congress have initiated legislative action
in response to the public's perception that the NCAA's enforce-
proposals include providing personal notice of the initial inquiry, access to taped inter-
views and hearing transcripts, and public reports. Id.
239. Muscatine, supra note 144, at El. Because the NCAA lacks subpoena power, it
is unable to "perfectly duplicate 'due process' as it is guaranteed under the Constitution."
Id. This rationale could also explain the special committee's decision not to provide par-
ties under investigation with an opportunity to call all relevant witnesses. Nevertheless,
unlike allowing cross-examinations, permitting parties under investigation to call relevant
witnesses would not necessarily be adversarial or unpleasant; moreover, it would be worth
the extra administrative costs. See supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text.
240. Not surprisingly, none of the proposed reforms specifically addressed concerns
relating to student-athletes directly, such as eligibility rules. In general, courts do not find
property or liberty interests at stake for student-athletes. See Buss, supra note 55, at 16;
Richard Staton, Recent Cases Concerning the Rights of Student Athletes, 10 J.C. & U.L.
209, 215-16 (1983-84). This result may be due to the courts' perceptions that avoiding
high burdens to the schools greatly outweighs the slight interest at stake. Buss, supra
note 55, at 17-18. If cases develop that cause the public to decide that student-athletes
are not being treated fairly, the NCAA may need to adopt appropriate reforms. Perhaps
public opinion led to the recent reversals of ineligibility determinations involving athletes
from Syracuse University and the University of Texas. See William C. Rhoden, N.C.A.A.
Restores McRae at Syracuse, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1991, at B13; Cambridge Is Allowed to
Play for Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1992, at B8. The issue of student-athletes' rights is
far from settled. Kimberly D. Kolback, Property Rights: Athletes Await the Call from the
Referee of the Courtroom, 2 ENT. & SPORTS L.J. 219, 241 (1985).
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ment procedures do not afford due process to investigated parties.
This Part examines these legislative efforts and concludes that the
NCAA, not state or.federal legislatures, should initiate due process
reform. Section A delineates the various state bills and laws and
discusses the recent lawsuit brought by the NCAA that questions
the constitutionality of Nevada's due process law. Section B exam-
ines the proposed federal legislation. Section C concludes by argu-
ing that the NCAA is the appropriate organization to oversee its
own reform.
A. State Legislation
Recently, twelve states have introduced or passed into law
legislation that would require the NCAA to afford due process to
institutions located within state boundaries.24 Not coincidentally,
major state universities in at least five of these states have experi-
enced first-hand the rigors and publicity of an extensive NCAA in-
vestigation.242 Although all of these bills share the same ultimate
goal,243 their specific due process provisions differ. This Section
compares the bills and discusses the NCAA's recent constitutional
challenge to the Nevada statute.
1. Comparison of State Provisions. The twelve bills and
laws fall into three general groups.244 The bills introduced in
Iowa,245 Nebraska,246 Rhode Island,247 and South Carolina24
241. In California, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Mississippi, New York, Rhode Island,
and South Carolina, bills have been introduced and are pending further action by the
legislature or governor. The bills in California, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, and Mississippi
have missed deadlines and have failed to move out of committee but may be reintro-
duced next session. Florida, Illinois, Nebraska, and Nevada have enacted due process
laws. State Due Process Legislation, NCAA NEWS, May 27, 1992, at 3 [hereinafter 1992
Legislation Chart].
242. Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Nevada, and South Carolina. Danny Robbins, Enforce-
ment Power of NCAA to Be Topic for State Legislature, L.A. TIMES, May 12, 1991, at
C3.
243. See, e.g., Illinois Due-Process Bill Is Signed, NCAA NEWS, Sept. 16, 1991, at 2.
The states want to "'ensur[e] that any procedures used to determine violations of
[NCAA] regulations are fair to the university, the athletes, the coaches and the stu-
dents.'" Id. (quoting Jim Edgar, governor of Illinois).
244. State Due Process Legislation, NCAA NEWS, July 31, 1991, at 10-11 [hereinafter
1991 Legislation Chart]. One common characteristic of all of the due process legislation is
a requirement that all penalties imposed be subject to judicial review. ld.
245. H.B. 450, 71st Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (1992). The House Committee on
Judiciary and Law Enforcement recommended against passage and the bill died in com-
1992]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42:99
contain the fewest number of specific requirements. Each of these
bills stipulates that NCAA enforcement proceedings must comply
with the due process guaranteed by the state's laws and constitu-
tion and that penalties inconsistent with the legislation may not beimposed. In addition, the Iowa, Nebraska, and South Carolina bills
create a cause of action for damages, costs, and attorney's fees. 9
The law enacted in Nevada' and the bills pending in Cali-
forniaP Minnesota,' and New York 3  specify the procedural
requirements the NCAA must provide to schools under investiga-
tion, such as an "impartial decision-maker," the right to legal
counsel, a record of the proceedings and "no ex parte communi-
cations."'  In addition, the NCAA must provide notice 5 and
the right to confront witnesses and evidence;z, 6 the NCAA must
bear the burden of proving its case by a preponderance of the evi-
dence; and any imposed penalties must be consistent with the
mittee in 1992. 1992 Legislation Chart, supra note 241.
246. The Nebraska Collegiate Athletic Association Procedures Act, NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 85-1201 to -1210 (Supp. 1990), was approved by the governor on February 1, 1990.
After stating that the NCAA is a private monopolist and exerts great power over the
member institutions, the law declares that:
[e]very stage and facet of all proceedings of a collegiate athletic association,
college, or university that may result in the imposition of a penalty for violation
of such association's rule or legislation shall comply with due process of law as
guaranteed by the Constitution of Nebraska and the laws of Nebraska.
Id. §§ 85-1202, -1203.
247. H.B. 8916, Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1992). This bill was introduced in Feb-
ruary 1992 and is still under consideration by the legislature. 1992 Legislation Chart,
supra note 241.
248. South Carolina Collegiate Athletic Association Procedures Act, S.B. 16, 109 Gen.
Assembly, Statewide Sess. (1992). The legislation is pending in the Senate,
249. 1991 Legislation Chart, supra note 244.
250. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 398.155-.255 (Michie 1991).
251. Gen. Assembly, 1991-92 Reg. Sess. (1992). The bill died in January 1992 when
the Senate failed to meet the deadline for its passage. 1992 Legislation Chart, supra note
241.
252. S.B. 1565, 77th Leg., 1992 Reg. Sess. (1992). The bill never got out of commit-
tee and died when the 1992 legislature adjourned. 1992 Legislation Chart, supra note 241.
253. S.B. 6020, 214th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (1992). The bill is in committee.
1992 Legislation Chart, supra note 241.
254. 1991 Legislation Chart, supra note 244.
255. The notice must specify the time, place and nature of the hearing; the procedur-
al rules; and the alleged violations and supporting evidence. Id.
256. This right includes: exchanging evidence thirty days before the hearing; applying
"[s]tate laws of privilege"; requiring written statements to be signed under oath; and per-
mitting objections to the evidence. Id.
257. Id.
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legislation and must be in proportion to the violations found,'
Moreover, the statutes in this group establish a private right of,
action for damages and injunctive relief.' 9
The laws passed in Florida2 and Illinois2 1 and the bills
pending in Kansas2  and Mississippi specify the greatest num-
ber of due process requirements2 Provisions in these laws stipu-
late that the NCAA must open the hearings to the public, provide
notice of the hearings to the institution and individuals charged,"5
furnish a complete transcript of the hearings,2" explain the find-
ings in writing,267 and provide full discovery 68 In addition, all
evidence and penalties must be consistent with the standards speci-
fied in the legislation. 9 Moreover, the legislation specify that the
258. Id.
259. Damages include lost income, attorney's fees, and costs. Id.
260. Collegiate Athletic Association Compliance Enforcement Procedures Act, FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 240.5339-.5349 (West Supp. 1992).
261. Collegiate Athletic Association Compliance Enforcement Procedures Act, ILL
ANN. STAT. ch. 144, paras. 2901-2913 (Smith-Hurd 1992).
262. KS S.B. 234, 74th Legis., 2d Sess. (1991). The bill passed the Senate but died in
committee in the House. 1992 Legislation Chart, supra note 241. Because the NCAA
headquarters are located in Kansas, the Kansas act differs from the Illinois and Florida
laws by extending protection to all NCAA enforcement proceedings, including investiga-
tions of institutions located outside Kansas. KS S.B. 234 § 3.
Since the bill died in committee, proposed amendments have drastically shifted the
focus of the legislation from due process concerns to the structure of the NCAA penal-
ties. See Proposed Amendments to KS S.B. 234. These amendments may be in response
to the NCAA's high-level lobbying efforts and the NCAA special committee's recommen-
dations. Adam Teicher, Bill Limiting NCAA's Power Dies in Kansas House, KANSAS
CrrY STAR, Mar. 13, 1992, at D6.
263. S.B. 2301, 107th Legis. (1992). This bill was introduced January 21, 1992, but
failed to meet the committee deadline. 1992 Legislation Chart, supra note 241.
264. 1991 Legislation Chart, supra note 244. To guarantee the applicability of due
process, the Florida and Illinois laws declare that the "[c]ollegiate athletics associations
engage in 'state action.'" However, these acts do not apply to investigations into academ-
ic qualifications. Instead of mentioning "state action," the Kansas bill stipulates that in-
vestigations must comply with state and federal due process. Id. The Mississippi bill high-
lights the state's involvement in collegiate athletics and calls for enlarged due process
protection. S.B. 2301 § 2(h), (n).
265. The notice must state the specific charges and the time and date of the hearing.
1991 Legislation Chart, supra note 244; S.B. 2301 § 4(3).
266. 1991 Legislation Chart, supra note 244; S.B. 2301 § 4(10). The Illinois law does
not require a record of the proceedings.
267. The NCAA must prove a violation by "clear and convincing" evidence. 1991
Legislation Chart, supra note 244; S.B. 2301 § 4(5).
268. 1991 Legislation Chart, supra note 244; S.B. 2301 § 4(6).
269. Penalties must also be in proportion to the violations found. 1991 Legislation
Chart, supra note 244; S.B. 2301 §§ 5(1), (2).
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hearing must occur within six months of the initial notification," °
that state civil rules of evidence apply, and that damages include
lost income, costs, and attorney's fees." These acts also protect
member institutions from retaliatory action by the NCAA by stat-
ing that the Association may not terminate membership because of
enactment of the legislation.'m
2. The NCAA's Constitutional Challenge to the Nevada Legis-
lation. Recently, the NCAA won a case that challenged the con-
stitutionality of Nevada's due process law. 3 The NCAA chal-
lenged the Nevada law because it was the first due process statute
to affect an NCAA investigation. 4 The NCAA filed suit after
the Nevada law-which requires several procedures that are not
included in current NCAA regulations 5-impeded a four-year
NCAA investigation of the recruitment of high school basketball
star Lloyd Daniels. 6 The district court held that the Nevada
270. This time limit is extended to nine months if the institution raises the violation.
The Florida law has nine-month and one-year statutes of limitations. 1991 Legislation
Chart, supra note 244. The Mississippi bill has one-year and eighteen-month statutes of
limitations. S.B. 2301 § 4(a).
271. The Kansas act also states that the NCAA could lose its tax-exempt status. 1991
Legislation Chart, supra note 244; S.B. 2301 § 9.
272. The legislation also forbids waivers of any provisions of the acts as a condition
of NCAA membership. However, the Illinois law permits any party under investigation to
waive rights. 1991 Legislation Chart, supra note 244; S.B. 2301 § 8(3).
273. NCAA v. Miller, 795 F. Supp. 1476 (D. Nev. 1992). This unprecedented case is
the first time the NCAA has sued a state and only the third time the Association has
introduced legal action. Danny Robbins, NCAA Fights Back, Challenges Nevada, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 13, 1991, at C1. The original defendants in the suit were Bob Miller, the
governor of Nevada; Jerry Tarkanian, UNLV's head basketball coach; Tim Grguirch,
UNLV's assistant basketball coach; Rob Ganulin, a former UNLV assistant basketball
coach; and Shelly Fischer, a former academic adviser for UNLV's basketball team. The
UNLV staff members were named in the suit because their lawyers notified the NCAA
that a current investigation must comply with the Nevada law. Id. Subsequent to the
initial filing, a district court judge dismissed Governor Miller from the suit and the Uni-
versity System of Nevada decided to intervene without choosing sides. Judge Dismisses
Gov. Miller in NCAA's Challenge of Nevada Law, NCAA NEWS, Jan. 22, 1992, at 2.
274. Judge Rules for NCAA in Nevada Case, NCAA NEWS, June 10, 1992, at 1.
275. Id. For example, the Nevada law specifies that the NCAA must afford individu-
als the right to confront all witnesses and evidence. However, NCAA regulations do not
provide an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. Id; see also supra text accompanying
notes 201-09.
276. Danny Robbins & Elliott Almond, NCAA Stuck in Nevada, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
13, 1991, at C1. The NCAA was unable to proceed with the case without risking viola-
tions of the Nevada law and further legal action from UNLV. For example, the Associa-
tion had not even held a prehearing conference because it could be classified as a pro-
ceeding under the Nevada law, thereby requiring the NCAA to provide the procedures
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statute was unconstitutional on two grounds and therefore "invalid
and unenforceable."'
First, the court held that the Nevada law violated the Com-
merce Clause of the United States Consitution. 8 Noting that the
NCAA conducts seventy-six annual championships involving teams
and individuals throughout the country, that the NCAA receives
hundreds of millions of dollars from interstate television broadcasts
of its events, and that recruiting of prospective student-athletes
generally occurs on a nationwide basis, the court concluded that
the "national scope of the NCAA's activities are sufficient to es-
tablish the requisite interstate involvement under the Commerce
Clause."' 9 Because the statute does not discriminate against in-
terstate commerce on its face, the court balanced the state's in-
terest in the legislation against the burden on interstate com-
merce.' The court held that the extraterritorial effect of the
statute, by impairing the NCAA's ability to uniformly enforce its
regulations and to provide for equal competition among its mem-
bers, outweighed Nevada's legitimate interests in enacting the
legislation.i
The court also held that the Nevada law violated the Contract
Clause of the United States Constitution m by substantially im-
pairing the NCAA's contractual relationship with UNLV. Citing
the NCAA's primary purpose of conducting intercollegiate athletic
events "on a level and fair playing field," the court ruled that if
all members did not follow the same rules, the NCAA's effective-
ness would be curtailed.' Nevada, moreover, was unable to
prove that the impairment of the NCAA's contract was necessary
or reasonable.'
established by the act. Id.
277. Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1488. The court did not reach the NCAA's two remain-
ing constitutional claims: that the statute violates the NCAA's and its members' First
Amendment right of association, and that the statute is vague and overbroad in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 1479, 1488."
278. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
279. Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1482.
280. Id. at 1483.
281. Id. at 1485. Nevada's interests included protecting its citizens and in-state institu-
tions from unfair hearings that are inconsistent with due process. IL at 1483.
282. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
283. Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1488.
284. Id. at 1486. The judge held that, by changing the enforcement regulations for
Nevada institutions, the state law "allow[ed] Nevada institutions to gain an unfair compet-
itive advantage over other members." Id. at 1487.
285. Id. at 1487-88. The law was not reasonable because, rather than protecting soci-
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Although at this time, the NCAA can proceed with its inves-
tigation of Lloyd Daniels and UNLV, the NCAA's fight against
state due process legislation is far from settled. UNLV's Coach
Tarkanian has indicated that he will appeal the district court's
decision, and NCAA Executive Director Richard Schultz has
stated that he believes the case will eventually reach the Supreme
Court.' In any event, this decision only affects the Nevada law.
If the NCAA.wishes to challenge other due process statutes, it
must battle each state law individually.'m
B. Federal Legislation
It is widely recognized that state legislation, in addition to
raising these constitutional issues, could lead to fifty versions of
due process requirements, even though the intent of each bill is
identical." A consistent standard for NCAA enforcement regula-
tions requires federal legislation. Indeed, Representative Ed Towns
(D-NY) has recently introduced a federal bill, the "Coach and
Athlete's Bill of Rights," in the House of Representatives." This
bill declares that because the NCAA has member institutions in all
fifty states that must travel across state lines to compete against
each other, the NCAA engages in interstate commerce.29' The
bill would require the NCAA to provide general due process pro-
tection to any coach, player, or institution associated with the
NCAA against whom it would take action. To ensure compli-
ance with due process, the bill holds that as a legislative matter,
the NCAA is a state actor when NCAA action leads to "the final
or decisive act of suspending or reprimanding a coach, player, or
ety, it targeted a narrow interest and it was not necessary because member institutions
can amend NCAA regulations. IdM at 1488.
286. Judge Rules for NCAA in Nevada Case, supra note 274, at 1.
287. Open Hearings Face an Uncertain Future, NCAA NEWS, June 24, 1991, at 28.
Moreover, both Tarkanian and the NCAA previously demonstrated their willingness to
pursue legal battles through appellate review to the Supreme Court. See NCAA v.
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
288. Judge Rules for NCAA in Nevada Case, supra note 274, at 1.
289. See, e.g., 1991 Hearings, supra note 144, at 60 (statement of James E. King,
Florida State Representative, and sponsor of Florida's due process legislation).
290. H.R. 2157, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
291. H.R. 2157 § 2. Other interstate commerce activities include broadcasting events
across the fifty states and "generat[ing] approximately $ 1,00,000,000 in interstate com-
merce each year." Id.
292. Id. § 3.
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institution."293 It would require the NCAA to establish enforce-
ment regulations consistent with due process within ninety days
after adoption of the act.294 The bill would also provide for a
study by the Secretary of Commerce on "the impact of NCAA
sanctions upon the telecommunications and commercial activities
of intercollegiate sporting events and the revenue loss caused by
such sanctions. 295 On June 19, 1991, the House Subcommittee on
Commerce, Consumer Protection; and Competitiveness conducted
a hearing to evaluate NCAA enforcement procedures and NCAA
compliance with due process.29 The subcommittee heard testimo-
ny from eight individuals with differing views on NCAA proce-
dures, including two head basketball coaches, a university presi-
dent, two sponsors of state due process legislation, and three indi-
viduals familiar with evaluating collegiate athletics." The majori-
ty of individuals testifying urged the committee to utilize federal
legislation to encourage the NCAA to adopt due process
protections that would be consistent across state lines.298 On the
other hand, a few witnesses urged the subcommittee to let the
NCAA handle reforms internally.211 Currently, the conclusions of
the subcommittee and the outcome of the federal legislation re-
main unknown.
293. Id § 4.
294. Id § 3(b).
295. Id § 5. This report must be submitted to Congress within six months of the en-
actment of the legislation. Id
296. 1991 Hearings, supra note 144, at 2 (opening statement of Cardiss Collins, Sub-
committee Chairman). Representative Collins also announced that future hearings would
consider the allocation of NCAA revenues, "the treatment of women's athletics,
[and] . . .preserving the academic integrity of the student athlete." Id
297. The witnesses were: Creed C. Black, president of the Knight Foundation; Burton
Brody, Professor of Law, University of Denver, Dale Brown, Head Basketball Coach,
Louisiana State University; Hon. James E. King, Member, Florida House of Representa-
tives, and sponsor of Florida due process bill; David P. Roselle, President, University of
Delaware, and former President, University of Kentucky; Jerry Tarkanian, Head Basket-
ball Coach, UNLV; Hon. Wint Winter, Jr., Membei, Kansas State Senate, and a sponsor
of the Kansas due process bill; and Don Yaeger, author of UNDUE PROCESS (1991). Id
at III.
298. See, e.g., id at 55 (testimony of Wint Winter); id. at 53-54 (testimony of Don
Yaeger); id. at 59-60 (testimony of James E. King).
299. See id at 38-40 (testimony of Dale Browfi); id. (testimony of David P. Roselle)
(stating that he found NCAA procedures fair and suggesting that the committee should
focus on the role of collegiate athletics in post-secondary education).
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C. The NCAA Should Rule Itself
As demonstrated previously, current NCAA enforcement
regulations comply with most due process requirements.' More-
over, the reforms proposed by the NCAA special committee, if
adopted by the membership, would meet an additional three re-
quirements."' The right to cross-examine witnesses and the right
to call all relevant witnesses are the only due process requirements
that would not be satisfied.' The NCAA should clearly explain
to the public why it cannot provide investigated parties with these
rights-and, if any of the other proposed reforms are not adopted
at the 1993 NCAA Convention, the NCAA should explain why it
cannot provide such reforms-e.g., the reforms would be too costly
to implement.
Richard D. Schultz, Executive Director of the NCAA, has
recognized that public pressure is driving the movement for re-
forming NCAA enforcement regulations and that the NCAA must
assume an active role.' He has cited the congressional hearings
and federal and state legislative actions as indications that contro-
versy still exists as to whether NCAA enforcement procedures are
fair and whether they provide due process to charged parties."
Given the inconsistencies that will arise from individual state
bills and the threat of constitutional challenges by the NCAA,
state legislation is not the appropriate means of solving the prob-
lem.' Moreover, state legislation may jeopardize the status of
the affected schools' membership in the NCAA if they are unable
to comply with NCAA regulations."° Finally, if the NCAA
adopts the recent recommendations of the special committee, it is
300. The requirements satisfied by current regulations are: notice of the proposed
action and the grounds asserted; an opportunity to present reasons why the proposed
action should not be taken; the right to know opposing evidence; a decision based ex-
clusively on the evidence presented; an opportunity to be represented by counsel; and a
written report prepared by the tribunal stating the findings of fact and the reasons for its
decisions. See supra subsection II(B)(2)(a).
301. The requirements that would be met are: an unbiased tribunal; the right to call
witnesses; the requirement that the tribunal prepare a record of the evidence presented;
and an open hearing. See supra notes 220-30 and accompanying text.
302. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
303. P. David Pickle, Pressures Could Shape NCAA's Future, Schultz Tells Convention,
NCAA NEWS, Jan. 8, 1992, at 1.
304. Id
305. In addition, because conferences usually consist of member institutions from dif-
ferent states, differences could arise within the same conference.
306. State Laws Might Lead to NCAA Expulsion, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 20, 1991, at C2.
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likely that most due process complaints will be rendered moot. In
that event, states may suspend their considerations of due process
bills3" and repeal due process legislation.'
If the NCAA attack on the Nevada law and potential chal-
lenges to other state laws succeed, federal legislation may be the
only means left to mandate due process starndards. However, it is
not clear that federal legislation is even necessary. Despite criti-
cisms that the NCAA has not voluntarily instituted reforms,' the
NCAA has consistently, since the 1978 congressional hearings,
adopted measures designed to improve the fairness of its enforce-
ment procedures. The motivation behind these reforms is irrele-
vant. What matters is that the NCAA has responded to and con-
tinues to respond to the outside pressures by implementing due
process reforms. The recent special committee's report demon-
strates that the NCAA recognizes the importance of public percep-
tion. 1° In addition, according to the president of the Knight
Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, a 22-member panel that
conducted an eighteen-month study on the governing structure of
collegiate athletics and issued a well-received comprehensive report
in 1991, "'[t]here is a window open now"' to institute reforms."
These recent developments emphasize that the NCAA is trying to
change its image and to comply with its member institutions' and
the public's expectations of fairness. It is now up to the member-
ship to decide whether to approve these reforms.
307. In fact, in six of the twelve states that have introduced such legislation, the bills
have died in committee during the 1992 Legislative Session. See supra subsection
III(A)(1). These delays have occurred as a result of the NCAA's willingness to imple-
ment its own reforms, as evidenced by the special committee's proposals. See, e.g., Danny
Robbins, Hearing on Due Process Is Canceled, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1991, at C5; Teicher,
supra note 262, at D6.
308. For example, the governor of Illinois indicated that the state would be willing to
reconsider the legislation if the NCAA adopts similar reforms. Illinois Due-Process Bill Is
Signed, supra note 243, at 2. Florida has also indicated a willingness to eliminate the law
if the NCAA adopts adequate reforms. Schultz Notes Some Progress with Legislatures,
NCAA NEWS, Apr. 29, 1992, at 1.
309. See, e.g., 1991 Hearings, supra note 144, at 34-36 (testimony of Jerry Tarkanian).
310. Committee Releases Enforcement-Review Report, supra note 217, at 12. After all,
the report recommends several due process reforms even though the current procedures
would probably satisfy judicial due process scrutiny. See supra Section II(B).
311. 1991 Hearings, supra note 144, at 10 (testimony of Creed C. Black).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The popularity and profitability of collegiate athletics largely
derives from the public's desire to watch athletes compete to be
the best-under fair playing rules. Similarly, the public has force-
fully demanded that the NCAA enforcement procedures also oper-
ate under fair rules. The NCAA has recently instituted due pro-
cess reforms, and it is possible that the 1993 NCAA Convention
will approve further due process protection for individuals and
institutions under investigation by the NCAA. Although not re-
quired by the Supreme Court, these reforms will improve the
fairness (perceived and actual) of NCAA enforcement regulations.
Indeed, because public opinion is behind the current push for
NCAA reform, it is imperative that the NCAA extensively publi-
cize the reforms implemented. Specifically, the NCAA should
make sure that both the public and the NCAA membership un-
derstand that current NCAA enforcement regulations satisfy most
due process requirements, and that the procedural changes recently
adopted and any amendments approved at the 1993 Convention
will provide additional significant due process protection. The
NCAA should also explain its decision not to support the current
proposals for independent hearing officers and open hearings, and
should indicate that it will nonetheless continue to review these
recommendations. Generally, the NCAA does play fair; it must
now convince the public.
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